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Abstract  
 
Financial reporting frauds and earnings manipulation have attracted high 
profile attention recently. There have been several cases by businesses of what 
appears to be financial statement fraud, which have been undetected by the 
auditors. 
 
In this thesis, the main purpose is to identify some of the reasons why auditors 
have not detected financial statement fraud and to suggest possible solutions for 
improving the audit process in these areas. In order to achieve this target, some 
cases of the fraudulent financial statements of revenue recognition will be 
analysed. 
 
The main reasons why auditors did not detect financial statement fraud from 
the technical side were application of analytical review procedures as 
“sufficient audit evidence;” weaknesses in audit risk model and risk assessment 
concerning internal control; and audit failure in revenue recognition and 
related-party transaction disclosure. The ethical issues that relate to the 
detection of fraud include auditor independence and the amount of non-audit 
services provided by the auditor.  
 
Several solutions will be recommended to enhance the audit process in 
detecting the financial statement fraud in accordance with the reasons we have 
determined. 
 
Key-words: auditors, audit risks, financial statement fraud, internal control, 
earnings management, revenue recognition. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Financial reporting frauds and earnings manipulation have attracted high 
profile attention recently. There have been several cases by businesses of what 
appears to be financial statement fraud, which have been undetected by the 
auditors. According to Joseph T. Wells (2002), one of the most remarkable 
cases in the twentieth century occurred in the 1970s, when an enterprising 
insurance salesman, Stanley Goldblum, managed easily to add 65,000 phoney 
policyholders to his company’s – Equity Funding – rolls, along with $800 
million of fake assets – right under the nose of its independent audit firm (cited 
in Rezaee, 2002). Since then, financial statement fraud together with audit 
failures have been increasingly a hot issue, including the recent cases of Enron, 
Waste Management, Xerox and AOL Time Warner, just to mention a few. 
 
The international auditing firm, Arthur Andersen, which audited Enron, appears 
to be an example of a firm entangled in a major audit failure. The case brought 
to light the weaknesses of the audit process. As a result, more people believe 
professional accountants have to learn how to detect financial statement fraud 
more effectively. One of the best ways is to profit from the mistakes of others. 
Enforcement actions against auditors have been rare (although we believe there 
will be more in the future), but the consequences of individual cases can be 
great and the cases offer the profession an opportunity to learn and grow 
(Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson, 2001). 
 
In order to understand the problems in modern auditing, we will give a brief 
overview of auditing history. Auditing in one form or another has existed as 
long as commercial life itself. There has always been a need by those who 
entrust their property to others to have some checks and control over the latter. 
There is general agreement, that modern financial auditing began to take shape 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. The emergence of corporate entities in 
which ownership and control were separated provided a need for financial 
auditing and the development of increasingly detailed disclosure requirements 
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for financial statements. The traditional audit role was a “conformance role.” 
Early audits focused on finding errors in balance sheet accounts and on 
stemming the growth of fraud associated with the increasing phenomenon of 
professional managers and absentee owners. The detection of fraud had a very 
important emphasis. As companies began to grow and become more complex 
during the nineteenth century, the detection of fraud became increasingly an 
unrealistic objective – although it was still generally perceived as one of the 
main objectives of a financial report audit, at least by the general public. 
 
The difference in perception of responsibilities and reality was addressed in the 
case of Kingston Cotton Mill Co (No 2) (1896) 2 Ch 279 at 289, 290 Lopes LJ 
(FTMS, 2001) which said of auditors: 
 
“…He is a watchdog, but not a bloodhound… If there is anything 
calculated to excite suspicion, he should probe it to the bottom 
but, in the absence of anything of that kind, he is only bound to be 
reasonably cautious and careful…”  
 
From the 1930s until the 1980s, the focus of the audit changed. Today, the 
modern external audit has been described as an independent examination of, 
and an expression of opinion on, the financial statements of an enterprise by a 
qualified auditor (Power, 1997). The financial audit process was to culminate in 
an opinion on whether the financial statements of an enterprise gave a “fair” 
view (US auditing) or “true and fair” view (European auditing). Consequently, 
detecting fraud is not the primary objective of auditing, although it is generally 
perceived to be so by the public. This conflict in the objectives of auditing has 
been described in terms of an “expectations gap.” The gap is between what the 
public expects – the detection of fraud – and what auditors claim to be 
delivering – an opinion on the financial statements which appeals to notions 
such as “fairness” and “true and fair” (Power, 1997). Auditors typically argue 
that the main responsibility for prevention and detection of fraud lies with 
management and its systems.  
 
When companies collapse, for whatever reason, but particularly in cases of 
alleged or actual fraud, public reaction focuses first on the auditors and the 
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possibility of their failure. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary for 
professionals to step up and take responsibility for continuing to improve their 
practices overall. The best use of a professional’s time and talents is to prevent 
problems before they occur (Hunt, 2000). 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
A series of big-name frauds in the past decade has been accompanied by 
lawsuits against auditors because of their suspected negligence in not detecting 
the financial statement fraud. As a result, auditors have risked the loss of 
money and what is even more influential, the loss of their reputations. This 
situation has pushed auditors and the related organisations and institutions to 
improve the audit processes in order to be more effective in identifying risk and 
collecting evidence for issuing audit opinions on financial statements.  
 
According to a study published in 1999 by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), the use of fictitious 
revenues is the most popular method of committing financial statement fraud. 
As reported by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner, 
Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., in his speech “Current SEC Financial Fraud Developments,” 
“Over half of financial report cases are directly related to revenue recognitions” 
(Hunt, 2000). Accounts receivable are attractive fraud targets, primarily 
because of the way receivables are viewed by lenders. Unlike inventory or 
fixed assets, accounts receivable – in the eyes of financiers – are the next best 
thing to cash. Because the mechanics are simple, sales/receivables fraud 
schemes lead the fraudulent financial statement pack (Wells, March 2001).  
 
In this thesis, the main problem is to understand some of the reasons why 
auditors have not detected financial statement fraud and, if possible, to suggest 
some improvements in the audit process. In order to achieve this target, we will 
analyse some cases of the fraudulent financial statements of revenue 
recognition. The chosen cases are: Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox. 
Since the companies we are going to study in the thesis applied US Generally 
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Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), we conduct our analysis in 
accordance with the US GAAP and appropriate regulations and laws.  
 
1.3 Purpose  
 
In our thesis, there are two main purposes. The first purpose, based on 
investigation of the fraudulent financial statement cases in the revenue 
recognition, is to identify the reasons why the auditors have not detected this 
fraud. The second purpose, based on the empirical findings about auditing 
methodology obtained from existing studies and interviews with various 
auditing firms in Sweden, is to suggest possible solutions for improving the 
audit process in the areas of detecting financial statement fraud.  
 
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
 
There are different types of financial statement fraud taking place in 
organisations. The COSO report (1999) lists common financial statement fraud 
techniques in the following categories: 
 
• Improper Revenue Recognition 
• Overstatement of Assets other than Accounts Receivable 
• Understatement of Expenses/Liabilities 
• Misappropriation of Assets 
• Inappropriate Disclosure 
• Other Miscellaneous Techniques 
 
The COSO Report states that the two most common techniques used by 
companies to engage in fraudulent activities are improper revenue recognition 
techniques, which overstate reported revenues, and improper techniques that 
overstate assets. It is unfeasible to study all of the mentioned fraud categories 
since the topic is too broad and the duration time of the thesis writing does not 
allow us to cover all of the techniques in depth. Therefore we chose to study the 
revenue recognition area, because it is the most widely used fraud technique, as 
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well as the most interesting and has been discussed extensively in the 
accounting world. 
 
In this thesis, we would like to emphasize the responsibility of the auditors for 
detecting frauds and errors. The study will be conducted from the perspective 
of the auditor.  
 
Recently, the American accounting profession directly addressed the external 
auditor’s responsibility for financial statement fraud detection in its Statement 
of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 entitled “Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit.” The Statement requires auditors to plan and 
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements 
are free of material misstatement, whether caused by fraud or error. SAS No. 
82 makes it clear that the auditor’s responsibility for detecting fraud is framed 
by the concepts of reasonable – not absolute – assurance and materiality and 
subject to cost/benefit decisions inherent in the audit process. Consequently, 
our arguments of requirements on auditors in the thesis, from the auditor 
perspective, will be limited within the framework of US Generally Accepted 
Auditing Standards (GAAS). 
 
Although we study the companies that use US GAAP, we limit our interviews 
to accounting organisations in Sweden: firstly, because the thesis is written in 
Sweden and we do not have enough financial sources and time to interview the 
US institutions; secondly, even though the topic currently is not as relevant in 
Sweden as it is in the US, the public and press in Sweden are concerned as 
well.  
 
We contacted ten Swedish auditing companies, the names of which are given in 
Section 2.3.2, Primary Data. However, we only managed to get one personal 
interview and one e-mail interview. Therefore the empirical evidence of the 
research is limited to the number of the respondents.  
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1.5 The Disposition of the Thesis 
 
Our written thesis is structured in accordance with our working investigation. 
The whole process is presented briefly as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction. 
 
Chapter 2 
Research Methodology. 
 
Chapter 3 
Literature Review. Financial Statement Fraud: Recognition of Revenue. 
 
Chapter 4  
Analysis. Case Studies: Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox.  
Reasons Why Auditors Have Not Detected Financial Statement Fraud. 
 
Chapter 5 
Recommendations for Improving the Audit Process. Empirical Findings and 
Suggestions From the Existing Studies. 
 
Chapter 6  
Summary and Suggestions for Further Research. 
 
 
Financial Statement Fraud   Research Methodology 
 
 7
2 Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Research is a complex process, which constitutes “data collection, coding, all 
other processes of preparing and analysing data, including the presentation of 
the results…” (Drucker-Godard, Ehlinger and Crenier, 2001). Therefore, at the 
beginning of research, once the research problem is identified, the choice for 
research methodology to direct this complex process in an orderly manner is a 
necessity.  
 
According to one source on research procedure, “Research methodology can be 
conceived as a system of rules and procedures. Such rules and procedures are 
important in research for the purposes of reasoning i.e. a specific logic to ac-
quire insights; inter-subjectivity i.e. reporting how the researcher has obtained 
the findings and communication i.e. reporting in manner to enable others to 
replicate or criticise…” (Ghauri, Gronhaug, Kristianslund, 1995, p. 24). 
 
In this chapter, we present our methodology with a purpose consistent with the 
above-stated rules. Our methodology consists of: what research approach we 
follow; which data collection (secondary and primary data) we select; which 
case study method we choose; and finally, how we establish the validity and 
reliability of our research results.  
 
2.2 Research Approach 
 
Our research approach is basically dependent on the elements of a normal 
research process. The elements of a research process mentioned by Brannick 
(1997), include:  
 
• theoretical perspective, 
• research question (research problem), 
• research category, 
• methodology strategy, 
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• data collection approach, and  
• data analysis. 
 
Any research must depend on a theoretical framework or existing concept. 
Since our research deals with the financial statement revenue recognition 
problem, we start our work by looking into the definition of financial statement 
fraud and the responsibility of auditors to detect fraud in the financial reports. 
This investigation provides us with the essential understanding to solve our 
research problem, “why have auditors not detected the financial statement fraud 
and how auditors can improve the audit process,” as described in our 
introductory chapter. 
 
“The nature of the research question determines whether the study can be 
classified as an exploratory, a descriptive or an explanatory/causal type study” 
(Brannick, 1997, p.7). In conjunction with the research questions, “What,” 
“When,” “Where,” “Who,” “How,” and “Why,” the research approach will fall 
into the categories “exploratory,” “descriptive” and/or “explanatory/causal.”  
 
As we have already defined our research problem and constructed our problem 
in the form of questions “who,” “why” and “how” in Chapter 1, we chose our 
research approach in this thesis as “descriptive” and “explanatory.” 
 
“Descriptive study is undertaken in order to ascertain and be able to describe 
the characteristics of the variables of interest in a situation” (Sekaran, 2000, p. 
125). In our research, we use the descriptive approach to describe the nature of 
fraudulent financial statements cases, which have happened recently, and to 
identify the possibilities for how the management in these cases could have 
manipulated their financial figures.  
 
“Explanatory study is undertaken in order to establish correlations between a 
number of variables” (Sekaran, 2000, p. 129). In our thesis, the explanatory 
part is presented through the relationship between the misstatement of financial 
reporting and the responsibility of the auditors. The investigation of this 
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relationship answers the question “why auditors have not discovered these 
frauds in a timely manner.”  
 
Since we have chosen our research category as “descriptive” and 
“explanatory,” we define our methodology strategy as case-based research. 
Although we are going to discuss the choice of the study method in section 2.4, 
at this stage we affirm that with the objective of our research, a case-based 
study is appropriate. This selected method affects our data collection method, 
which is discussed below. 
 
2.3 Data Collection 
 
“Data collection is crucial to all research. Through this process, researchers 
accumulate empirical material on which to base their research” (Ibert, 
Baumard, Donada and Xuereb, 2001, p. 172). 
 
Data is either primary or secondary. The usage of both kinds of data has its 
advantages and disadvantages. In this thesis, we are combining both of these 
sources of data in order to obtain the most convincing evidence for our 
argument and conclusions. 
 
It depends on the characteristics of the research whether “the researcher adopts 
a quantitative or qualitative approach for their data collection methods” (Ibert, 
et al., 2001, p. 172). Since our research is more descriptive and based on cases, 
we have chosen the qualitative approach for collecting our primary data. This 
means we plan to interview several accounting firms and one professional 
accounting organisation, Professional Institute For Authorised Public 
Accountants (FAR), in Sweden. We were less successful than we had hoped in 
obtaining interviews, as we explain in section 5. The result of these interviews 
will provide the basis for our conclusion on the research problem. We are going 
to discuss separately how we will gather the secondary and primary data for our 
qualitative research. 
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2.3.1 Secondary Data 
 
It is true that “secondary data is data that was developed for some purpose other 
than helping to solve the problem in hand” (Fay, 1997, p. 215). This process is 
essentially the literature review. We use secondary data for our conceptual 
foundation. This secondary data also serves our purpose of describing the 
situation of the cases, and the arguments among the professionals about them.  
 
Regarding the collection of secondary data, in this research we look more at 
external sources rather than at internal sources. The external sources we use are 
annual reports of companies under investigation of having committed fraud. 
These annual reports are the most precise and official evidence to support our 
analysis because they were publicly issued to stockholders who suffered 
directly from their misstatement. Additionally, we use the litigation documents 
of the SEC against the companies we study.  
 
Articles and books are also useful sources of information. Books are “primarily 
useful for historical background” (Fay, 1997, p. 220). They are critical in 
building our theoretical framework, especially in the definition of financial 
statement fraud and the identification of the responsibility of auditors for 
detecting fraud. In the discussion of auditors’ responsibility and the technical 
auditing skills, we will search for the regulations and rules on auditing 
standards in order to know the requirements under the generally accepted 
auditing standards. The source we rely on is the Statements of Auditing 
Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a trade 
association for the accounting industry.  
 
Articles in professional literature, such as The Journal of Accountancy, The 
Wall Street Journal and Journal of Accounting Research, etc., as well as from 
the internet, are the main sources of information we use for our case study 
investigation. Additionally, we will use articles from other reliable business 
journals and newspapers. The more reflections we get from different 
professionals who have commented on the actual case studies, the more precise 
and unbiased view we will gain. 
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2.3.2 Primary Data 
 
Among the choices for collecting the primary data such as “observations, 
surveys (questionnaires) and interviews” (Ghauri, et al., 1995), taking into 
account the research problem we are dealing with, we have selected interviews 
and sent questionnaires as the best alternative for our research.  
 
Our interviews are conducted through two channels: interview by e-mail and 
personal interview. The interviewees are some Swedish auditing firms and the 
Swedish accounting professional institution.  
 
The audit companies we contacted are listed below: 
 
− Deloitte & Touche AB 
− Ernst & Young AB 
− KPMG Bohlins AB 
− PriceWaterhouseCoopers AB 
− BDO Revision Väst KB 
− Frejs Revisionsbyrå AB 
− Gothia Revision AB 
− Gunilla Kolm Revisionbyrå AB 
− Hallén & Samuelsson Revisionbyrå AB 
− SET Revisionbyrå AB 
 
We could get interviews with two companies: a personal interview with Ernst 
& Young and an e-mail interview with KPMG. The person in the auditing firm 
we chose to interview was the one who is in charge of technical aspects called 
“audit technical board” in the company. These persons should be 
knowledgeable and interested in the problems we are studying. 
 
Before implementing the interviews, we studied the three cases thoroughly. 
From the result of the cases review, we pinpointed the issues, which we think 
are the most critical. We created a questionnaire based on our study and 
analysis (Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). 
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As the problem we are dealing with is judgmental and applicable to a case-to-
case basis, the type of questionnaire we sent is in the form of open-ended 
questions. Therefore, we leave room for the respondents to provide feedback 
from their own views. There are three main issues, which we focus on in our 
questions. Firstly, we want to know the opinion from auditors about the 
increasing number of revenue recognition fraud cases recently. Secondly, we 
want to know from auditors, what lies behind these undetected errors: is it an 
ethical or technical issue? The other questions concern how “to improve the 
audit process” and “to avoid the threat of undiscovered errors in the financial 
report.” This list of questions was sent in advance to the accounting firms (who 
agreed to be personally interviewed) for their advanced preparation. The 
interview meeting was conducted, based upon the information previously 
provided by interviewee. 
 
The questions we send to FAR, the Swedish professional accounting 
institution, mainly deal with the rules and regulations aspect. We chose to 
interview FAR, because it plays a leading role in the development of 
professional standards, education and information for the audit profession in 
Sweden (www.far.se, 2002). However, we were unable to obtain a response 
from FAR. 
 
2.4 Case Study Methodology 
 
“In relatively less-known areas, where there is little experience and theory 
available to serve as a guide, intensive study of selected examples is a very 
useful method of gaining insight and suggesting hypotheses for further 
research, the case study method is often used for these types of study” (Ghauri, 
et al., 1995, p. 87). 
 
Based on our topic research, it is undeniable that there has been extensive back 
and forth argument in the professional world and the general and business 
public about the reasons why auditors have not detected the financial statement 
revenue recognition problems recently. We realise this issue has not been 
investigated in our Accounting and Finance Master’s programme by former 
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students. Therefore, we consider that our topic is apparently new in our 
programme, and we have little experience and theory available to serve as 
guide, as mentioned above. That is why we chose the case study method as the 
most appropriate method for our research, which is explanatory and descriptive 
in nature.  
  
A definition of the case study methodology, as proposed by Ghauri, et al. 
(1995) is useful. “As most case studies are done through a review of existing 
historical material and records plus interviews, the case study method is quite 
similar to historical review, but it is different in the sense that here we have a 
possibility of direct observation and interaction” (Ghauri, et al., 1995, p. 88). 
 
In our case studies, we consistently use historical review (secondary data) as 
the main tool. We describe what happened in the past with the companies we 
chose so that we can understand the situation in conjunction with the theoretical 
framework given in the earlier section. We also implement interviews (primary 
data) to get the reflections of auditors who are legally supposed to detect 
financial statement fraud. This interview technique supports both our analysis 
in the Chapter 4 and our recommendations in Chapter 5. 
 
Considering the limitations of time and scope, as well as the availability of 
research material, we have selected three recent typical cases for our case 
study. Based on these three cases, we believe that we have enough material to 
see some similarities and differences, which will strengthen our ability to make 
judgments in other and similar situations. 
 
We selected three well-known cases, Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox, 
for our investigation. In all these three cases, companies were charged with 
earnings management fraud. The three cases have in common that the 
companies were recognised as “blue chip” companies before being charged 
criminally for cooking their books. And they were all audited by major 
international accounting firms. 
 
We have three criteria for selecting these three companies. Besides the obvious 
revenue recognition fraud issues, the first criterion we considered when 
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choosing the cases is that they must have happened recently. The second 
criterion is that these cases are representatives from different industries: 
Lernout & Hauspie (a software developer); Sunbeam (a consumer products 
manufacturer); and Xerox (a manufacturing company producing document 
machines). Therefore, the way they manipulated their figures could be various 
due to the different nature of their businesses. The third criterion is that, of the 
three cases, there should be at least one case that has been resolved. Therefore, 
we can see the whole case from the beginning, “being indicted,” to the end, 
“guilty of committing fraud.” That is the case of Sunbeam and Xerox, while the 
Lernout & Hauspie case is still on-going. 
 
While most cases of suspected financial statement fraud have occurred in the 
United States, Lernout & Hauspie is of particular interest since it is a European 
company. Sunbeam and Xerox are both American companies. Lernout & 
Hauspie and Xerox’s books were audited by KPMG LLP while Sunbeam’s 
were audited by Arthur Andersen.  
 
2.5 Research Evaluation 
 
For any research work, obviously the validity and the reliability are considered 
at the end. The validity and reliability are the measuring instruments, which are 
used to assess the credibility of the research. In this section, we describe our 
research’s validity and reliability by stating our research method path. We 
consider this as a means to strengthen our research’s credibility. 
 
2.5.1 Validity 
 
Validity is the term used to express the exemption from “non-random error” in 
the application of a measuring instrument. “Non-random error” (also called 
“bias”), refers to a measuring instrument producing a systematic biasing effect 
on the measured phenomenon” (Drucker-Godard, et al., 2001, p. 202). In 
qualitative research, this bias is affected by the methodology used. 
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To improve the validity in research, we attach special importance to the usage 
of qualitative tools in our methodology. These include documentary sources 
and interviews. 
 
Regarding the validity of documentary sources, we study newspapers, articles, 
and statements relating to the cases selected and by interpreting them within the 
framework of the theoretical background, we believe that our analysis remains 
true to the reality of the facts/cases being studied. 
  
Regarding the validity of interviews, we direct our interviews to the most 
knowledgeable group of people on the issues in the accounting organisations. 
The questions prepared for the interviews are designed on the basis of the 
thorough study of the cases.  
 
2.5.2 Reliability 
 
“The reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which the measure is free 
from “random error” and hence offers consistent measurement across time and 
across the various items in the instrument. In other words, the reliability of a 
measure indicates the stability and consistency with which the instrument 
measures the concept and helps to assess the “goodness” of a measure” 
(Sekaran, 2000, p. 204) 
 
While the “stability” is presented through “low vulnerability to the changes in 
the situation” (Sekaran, 2000, p. 205), the “consistency” is assessed through the 
research method constructed.  
 
We agree with Drucker-Godard, et al. (2001, p. 210) that “It is important for 
researchers to precisely describe their research design, so as to aim for a higher 
degree of reliability.” As discussed above in the research approach, we have 
constructed our methodology approach to solve our research problem. Our 
research design is conducted consistently throughout the research, meaning 
here, the case studies selected, and the questionnaires and interviews prepared. 
Therefore, the possibility of replicating the factual analysis of the study is 
probable. However, as we previously stated, our research analysis is 
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judgmental. Conclusions and suggestions are our own, and are dependent on 
the results of our investigations. Other researchers, using the same investigative 
techniques, might form different conclusions and suggestions. From our point 
of view, however, with our clear purpose of study, well-structured research 
design, and the maintenance of a good research trail, we believe that we have 
taken important assurances to give our research reliability.  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
In connection with our research question, as stated in Chapter 1, we selected 
our research design as a combination of a theoretical framework and 
descriptive and explanatory research. The sources of information we explore 
are collected from primary and secondary data in which primary data is 
obtained from e-mail and personal interviews and secondary data from public 
sources. From the nature of research, we have decided to conduct the research 
in the form of the case study method. The analysis of case studies gives us the 
understanding of the issues in relation to the theories given. This also helps us 
to find the critical points to prepare the research questions. Our interpretation of 
the interview responses, as well as suggestions made, is subject to the 
researchers’ own judgment. 
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3 Financial Statement Fraud: Earnings Management and 
Revenue Recognition 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The economic recession, and even more, the current business environment, 
have pushed the top management of many companies into paying attention to 
“how to make the financial statements look better” in order to attract investors. 
The pressure from stock market expectations, analysts’ forecasts and earnings 
targets has piled another burden on management’s shoulders, especially in the 
companies, which have been regarded as “blue chip” in their vigorous days. In 
addition, the favourable stock bonuses received by managers are also the 
incentives for high earnings. As a result, many companies have used 
“aggressive accounting” as an “earnings management” tool in order to achieve 
those targets. As Ian Griffiths (1981, p. 1) puts it in his so-called bible of the 
business world “Creative Accounting:” “It is the biggest con trick since the 
Trojan horse.” 
 
In a certain sense, we can say creative accounting in itself is totally legitimate, 
when we view such accounting as making choices among accepted alternatives. 
Accounting rules and regulations leave room to make choices among different 
accounting procedures. The grey area is, however, perhaps too large. So a com-
pany chooses the most appropriate rules that can benefit its intentions. But the 
line between managing accounts and fraud is very thin.  
 
Several recent financial statement fraud cases have exposed various methods of 
earnings management, which have crossed that line. They can be illegitimate 
revenue recognition, inappropriate deferral of expenses, fictitious sales, pre-
mature sales, reversal, or use of unjustified reserves (Rezaee, 2002).  
 
In this chapter, we will define financial statement fraud and examine the extent 
of the auditors’ responsibility to detect it. We will give an overview of audit 
risk model. Next we will discuss the concept of earnings management, by 
means of revenue recognition problems, and its relation with financial 
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statement fraud. In the next chapter, we investigate three financial statement 
fraud case studies: Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox. 
 
3.2 Definition – Financial Statement Fraud  
 
Financial statement fraud has been defined differently by academicians and 
practitioners. The following are some examples of definition of fraud in 
general:  
 
Encyclopædia Britannica In law, the deliberate misrepresentation of fact for 
the purpose of depriving someone of a valuable 
possession.  
Merriam Webster 
Unabridged 
Intentional perversion of truth in order to induce 
another to part with something of value or to 
surrender a legal right.  
Oxford English 
Dictionary 
Criminal deception; the using of false 
representations to obtain an unjust advantage or to 
injure the rights or interests of another. 
 
Unfortunately there is no single definition of financial statement fraud. The rea-
son is that, until recently, the term has not been defined at all. The accounting 
profession used the terms intentional mistakes and irregularities instead 
(Rezaee, 2002). In 1997 the AICPA, in its Statement of Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 82, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,” refers 
to financial statement fraud as intentional misstatements or omissions in 
financial statements (§ 4).  
 
Financial statement fraud is typically conducted by management or with their 
consent and knowledge. Elliott and Willingham (1980, p. 4) view financial 
statement fraud as management fraud:  
 
“The deliberate fraud committed by management that injures 
investors and creditors through materially misleading financial 
statements.”  
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Accordingly, the terms management fraud and financial statement fraud are 
often used interchangeably. What is common in different definitions of fraud in 
general, and financial statement fraud in particular, is that it is intentional and 
injures other parties. Besides investors and creditors, auditors are one of the 
victims of financial statement fraud. They might suffer financial loss (e.g. loss 
of position, fines, etc.) and/or reputation loss (Rezaee, 2002).  
 
3.3 The Auditor’s Responsibilities for Detecting Fraud 
 
In this thesis we frame our discussion about auditor’s responsibilities for de-
tecting fraud within the US accounting standards. The fraud cases we will study 
in the next chapter are about the companies that used US GAAP and therefore 
all the framework and analysis will be based on the US accounting rules and 
principles. 
 
There is no clear obligation for auditors to detect any kind of fraud that may 
have occurred. As Heim (2002, p. 60) says: “absolutely not!” Under SAS No. 
82 (§ 12), the auditor’s responsibility relates to the detection of material mis-
statements caused by fraud and is not directed to the detection of fraudulent 
activity per se. 
 
The first of the AICPA Statement of Auditing Standards, SAS No. 1, states:  
 
The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement, whether caused by 
error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and the 
characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, 
but not absolute, assurance that material misstatements are 
detected. The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform 
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, 
whether caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the 
financial statements are detected.  
Financial Statement Fraud                         Earnings Management and Revenue Recognition  
 
 
 
20
 
Specifically, SAS No. 82 defines the auditors’ responsibility as follows:  
 
• Assess the risk of material misstatements due to fraud by considering fraud-
risk factors (§12).  
• Respond to the results of the risk assessment (§ 26).  
• Document identified fraud-risk factors and the responses to those factors (§ 
37).  
• Communicate fraud to management (§ 38).  
 
Next we will explain the key concepts of the SAS No. 1, based on the summary 
of Arens and Loebbecke (1997). 
 
Material versus Immaterial Misstatements 
Misstatements are usually considered material if the combined uncorrected 
errors and fraud in the financial statements would likely have changed or 
influenced the decisions of a reasonable person using the statements.  
 
Reasonable Assurance 
Assurance is a measure of the level of certainty that the auditor has obtained at 
the completion of the audit. The concept of reasonable, but not absolute, 
assurance indicates that the auditor is not an insurer or guarantor of the 
correctness of the financial statements.  
 
Errors versus Fraud 
SAS No. 82 (§ 3) distinguishes between two types of misstatements, errors and 
fraud. Either type of misstatement can be material or immaterial. An error is an 
unintentional misstatement of the financial statements, whereas fraud is 
intentional.  
 
Professional Scepticism 
Professional scepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a 
critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor should not assume that 
management is dishonest, but the possibility of dishonesty must be considered.  
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An auditor can be held liable for fraud when he or she acted with an intent to 
deceive. However, actions alleging fraud result from lawsuits by third parties. 
The plaintiff (third party) must prove the following (Messier, 1997): 
 
• a false representation by the accountant, 
• knowledge or belief by the accountant that the representation was false, 
• the accountant intended to induce the third party to rely on the false 
representation, and 
• the third party suffered damages.  
 
Courts have held that fraudulent intent may be established by proof that the 
accountant acts with knowledge of the false representation or with reckless 
disregard for its truth (Messier, 1997). 
 
3.4 Assessing Risks of Fraud 
 
In order to have an overview of what the auditor does and how current audit 
procedure works considering risks and detecting fraud, we provide the concept 
of the audit risk model and the risk factors of the financial statement fraud, 
which the auditor should have considered in his or her job.  
 
3.4.1 The Audit Risk Model 
 
3.4.1.1 Overview  
 
The audit risk model is the model established by GAAS in 1983 for carrying 
out audits that require auditors to use their judgment in assessing risks and then 
in deciding what procedures to carry out (AICPA, 1999).  
 
The model allows auditors to take alternatives in selecting an audit approach. 
For example, the model calls for auditors to have an understanding of the 
client’s business and industry, the systems employed to process transactions, 
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the quality of personnel involved in accounting functions, the client’s policies 
and procedures related to the preparation of financial statements, etc.  
 
The model requires auditors to gain an understanding of a company’s internal 
control, and to test the effectiveness of controls if the auditor intends to rely on 
them when considering the nature, timing and extent of the substantive tests to 
be carried out. For example, if controls over sales and accounts receivable are 
strong, the auditor might send a limited number of accounts receivable 
confirmation requests at an interim date and rely on the controls and certain 
other tests for updating the accounts to year end. Conversely, if controls are not 
strong, the auditor might send a larger number of accounts receivable 
confirmations at year-end. The model requires an assessment of the risk of 
fraud (intentional misstatements of financial statements) in every audit. 
 
Based on the auditor’s assessment of various risks and any tests of controls, the 
auditor makes judgments about the kinds of evidence (from sources that are 
internal or external to the client’s organization) needed to achieve “reasonable 
assurance.”  
 
3.4.1.2 Technical Briefing of the Model 
 
Audit risk (AR) is the risk that the auditor gives an inappropriate audit opinion 
when the financial statements are materially misstated. Audit risk has three 
components: inherent risk (IR), control risk (CR) and detection risk (DR). 
 
For an auditor to give an inappropriate audit opinion, i.e. giving a true and fair 
opinion when in fact the financial statements are not true and fair and vice 
versa, there must be three conditions present, which are: a material error must 
occur (related to IR); the company itself must not detect the error (related to 
CR); and the auditor must fail to detect the error (related to DR). Since the 
three conditions correspond to the three components of audit risk, we discuss 
each component specifically. 
 
Inherent risk refers to the susceptibility of an account balance or class of 
transactions to misstatement that could be material, individually or when 
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aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, assuming that there 
were no related internal controls (FTMS, 2001). There is obviously a higher 
chance of an error occurring where there is high inherent risk. 
Control risk is the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an account bal-
ance or class of transactions and that could be material individually or when 
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, will not be pre-
vented or detected and corrected on a timely basis by the accounting and con-
trol systems (FTMS, 2001). Therefore, there is a higher chance of the error re-
maining undetected when there is high control risk. If the company has good 
internal controls, there is a high chance that the control system will detect a 
material error. That leads to lower control risk. 
 
Detection risk is the risk that an auditor’s substantive procedures will not de-
tect a misstatement that exists in an account balance or class of transactions that 
could be material, individually or when aggregated with misstatements in other 
balances or classes (FTMS, 2001).  
 
Assuming the auditor performs appropriate audit work, he or she is more likely 
to detect a material error when he or she tests a large number of items than 
when he or she only tests a small number of items. Therefore, the larger the 
sample size (i.e. doing more audit work), the lower the detection risk. 
 
From the descriptions of relationship among the audit risk components, the 
audit risk model is expressed in a mathematical way as follows: 
 
AR = IR x CR x DR.  
 
The audit risk model is generally used at the planning stage of the audit to de-
termine the planned detection risk for an assertion. This is based on the audi-
tor’s planned level of control risk; however, the assessment can be revised as 
the audit progresses. The lower the assessments of inherent and control risks, 
the higher the acceptable level of detection risk. This ensures that audit risk is 
reduced to an acceptable level. 
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Auditors are required to assess IR and CR at three levels: high risk, medium 
risk and low risk. GAAS requires that, if CR is to be assessed at less than the 
high level, the auditor must test the effectiveness of controls to support that 
assessment. A high risk assessment means that the auditor believes controls are 
unlikely to be effective, or the evaluation of their effectiveness would be 
inefficient (POB Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 2000).  
 
The importance of the assessments of inherent and control risk is highlighted 
by their effects on detection risk (DR). The effects can be depicted in 
mathematical form by the equation DR = AR / (IR x CR). The greater the 
inherent and control risks, the lower the detection risk needs to be, resulting in 
“more” procedures (“more” includes their nature and timing as well as their 
extent) that the auditor would need to carry out.  
 
The relationship of the assessment of risks is depicted in the audit risk matrix: 
Auditor’s assessment of 
control risk is: 
Inherent Risk 
High Medium Low 
High Lowest Lower Medium 
Medium Lower Medium Higher 
 
Auditor’s 
Assessment of 
inherent risk 
Low Medium Higher Highest 
Table 1. The Audit Risk Matrix. 
Source: FTMS (2001, p.31). 
 
From the matrix, the acceptable detection risk is the shaded area. Although the 
model and the matrix are illustrated in mathematical terms, in reality it is highly 
judgmental. The objective in an audit is to limit AR to a low level, as judged by 
the auditor. 
 
One reminder to auditors is that the audit risk model does not include any other 
risks which should be counted. The “risks” are known as “engagement risk,” 
“client risk” or “client continuance.” Engagement risk represents the overall 
risk associated with an audit engagement. (Colbert, Luehlfing and Alderman, 
1996). Because of rapid changes in the business environment, active 
consideration of whether to continue to serve a client may help to protect 
auditors themselves (AICPA Practice Alert No. 94-3, 1994). 
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3.4.1.3 Audit Firm Methodologies 
 
While all audits of financial statements of publicly held US companies are 
required to comply with GAAS, audit firms, at liberty, tailor their audit 
processes or methodologies in the manner that best suits their needs, so long as 
the processes or methodologies result in audits that comply with GAAS.  
 
Audit firms also take into consideration their clients’ expectations, such as 
expectations that the auditor will inform them of matters that might benefit 
their businesses.  
 
3.4.2 The Risk Factors of Financial Statement Fraud 
 
An important part of planning every audit is to assess the risk of errors and 
fraud. In making risk assessments for fraud, auditors should keep in mind that 
fraud typically includes three characteristics, which are known as the “fraud 
triangle:” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Fraud Triangle. 
 
Although the idea of fraud triangle dates back to the late 1940’s, the accounting 
rules address the issues for the first time in SAS No. 82 (§ 6).  
 
The three points of the fraud triangle may be explained as follows 
(Montgomery, Beasley, Menelaides and Palmrose, 2002): 
 
• Incentive/Pressure: Pressures or incentives on management to materially 
misstate the financial statements, 
Fraud Triangle 
        Incentive/Pressure Attitude/Rationalization 
Opportunity 
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• Opportunity: Circumstances that provide an opportunity to carry out 
material misstatement in the financial statements, 
• Attitude/Rationalization: An attitude, character or set of ethical values that 
allows one or more individuals to knowingly and intentionally commit a 
dishonest act, or a situation in which individuals are able to rationalize 
committing a dishonest act.  
 
Additionally, SAS No. 82 (§§ 16-17) has identified three categories of risk 
factors for fraudulent financial statements, summarised in Table 2. 
 
CATEGORY 1 
Management’s 
Characteristics and 
Influence over the Control 
Environment 
 
CATEGORY 2 
 
Industry Conditions
CATEGORY 3 
 
Operating 
Characteristics of 
Financial Stability 
These pertain to management’s 
abilities, pressures, style, and 
attitude relating to internal control 
and the financial reporting process. 
 
These involve the 
economic and regulatory 
environment in which the 
entity operates.  
These pertain to the 
nature and complexity of 
the entity and its 
transactions, financial 
condition and 
profitability. 
Examples of Risk Factors 
 A motivation for management to 
engage in fraudulent financial report-
ing, such as an excessive interest by 
management to maintain or increase 
the entity’s stock price or earnings 
trend through the use of unusually 
aggressive accounting practices.  
 A failure by management to dis-
play and communicate an appropriate 
attitude regarding internal control and 
the financial reporting process, such 
as a domination of management by a 
single person or small group without 
compensating controls. 
 High turnover of senior manage-
ment, counsel, or board members. 
 Unreasonable demands for audi-
tor completion of the audit or report 
issuance and restrictions on auditor 
access to people or information. 
Examples of Risk Factors 
 New accounting, 
statutory, or regulatory 
requirements that could 
impair the financial 
stability or profitability of 
the entity. 
 Declining industry 
with increasing business 
failures and significant 
declines in customer 
demand. 
 Rapid changes in the 
industry, such as high 
vulnerability to rapidly 
changing technology or 
rapid product 
obsolescence.  
Examples of Risk Factors 
 Significant pressure to 
obtain additional capital 
necessary to stay com-
petitive considering the 
financial position of the 
entity. 
 Significant, unusual, 
or highly complex trans-
actions, especially those 
close to year-end, that 
pose difficult “substance 
over form” questions. 
 Overly complex or-
ganisational structure in-
volving numerous or un-
usual legal entities, mana-
gerial lines of authority, or 
contractual arrangements 
without apparent business 
purpose. 
Table 2. Categories of Risk Factors for Fraudulent Financial Statements.  
Adapted from Arens and Loebbecke (1997). 
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3.5 Definition – Earnings Management 
 
The concept of earnings management has been explained differently by 
academicians, researchers, practitioners, and various authoritative bodies. 
Rezaee (2002) selected the most commonly accepted definitions of earnings 
management defined by academicians and researchers as follows: 
 
Schipper:  …a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some 
private gain. 
Healy and Wahlen:  Earnings management occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. 
Merchant:  Earnings management can be defined as any action on 
the part of management, which affects reported income 
and which provides no true economic advantage to the 
organization and may, in fact, in the long term, be 
detrimental. 
 
The concept of earnings management is usually discussed in conjunction with 
financial statement fraud. The high profile of earnings management fraud 
hastens the need to define concretely “earnings management” since many 
people in the accounting profession acknowledge that some earnings 
management techniques are not fraudulent and many accountants, analysts, and 
investors believe that good business practice requires managers to manage 
earnings (Magrath and Weld, 2002). 
 
A matter of fact is that management uses accounting choices consistent with 
GAAP to manage earnings in performing its assigned managerial functions. 
Most of this action involves judgments and estimates within GAAP. Since the 
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line between legitimate earnings management and fraudulent accounting 
practices is fragile, it is easy for the management to step over the line in order 
to meet the earnings expectations. The former SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, in 
his 1998 “Numbers Game” speech, expressed the view that “too many 
corporate managers, auditors, and analysts let the desire to meet earnings 
expectations override good business practices” and he called for “a 
fundamental cultural change on the part of corporate management and the 
entire financial community” (Magrath and Weld, 2002). 
 
3.6 Earnings Management – Revenue Recognition 
 
Revenue Recognition is one of the various forms of earnings management. The 
revenue recognition problem usually involves recording revenue before it is 
earned, which is before a sale is complete, before the product has been 
delivered, or while the customer can still void or delay the sale (Rezaee, 2002). 
 
The study by COSO in 1999 has listed common financial statement fraud 
techniques in which improper revenue recognition was in first place of all the 
categories. Improper revenue recognition includes bill-and-hold sales, 
conditional sales, fictitious sales, and improper cut-off sales.  
 
The improper revenue recognition issues, which have occurred recently, are 
usually found in the following schemes: 
 
Bill and Hold Sales Transactions 
“Bill and hold” is the term used to describe when a selling company holds 
merchandise to accommodate a customer (Pesaru, 2002). In a bill and hold 
deal, the customer agrees to buy goods by signing the contract, but the seller 
retains possession until the customer requests shipment. An abuse of this 
practice occurs when a company (the seller) recognises the early revenue of bill 
and hold sales transactions (Rezaee, 2002). 
 
The controversy and difficulty in identifying this kind of “earnings 
management” is that, in the bill and hold deal, the transactions meet two 
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conditions of (1) realised or realisable; and (2) earned as required by GAAP. 
However, commonly the revenue is recognised only when the goods and 
services are delivered to the customers. Therefore, from the auditor side, it is 
necessary to understand the substance of the transactions to make sure that they 
are legitimate and arm’s-length transactions (Rezaee, 2002). 
 
Timing of Revenue Recognition 
Timing of revenue recognition is manipulated by keeping the accounting 
records open beyond the reporting period to record sales of the subsequent 
reporting period in the current period. Many revenue frauds involve improper 
cut-offs as of the end of the reporting period (Rezaee, 2002).  
 
The typical case of timing of revenue recognition is leasing transactions. 
Abuses of revenue recognition under leasing transactions can occur when a 
company overstates the amount of up-front revenue on sales-type leases 
(Pesaru, 2002). 
 
Side Agreements 
Side agreements are used to alter the terms and conditions of recorded sales 
transactions to entice customers to accept the delivery of goods and services. 
They may create obligations or contingencies relating to financing 
arrangements or to product installation or customisation that may relieve the 
customer of some of the risks and rewards of ownership. Frequently, side 
agreements are hidden from the entity’s board of directors and outside auditors, 
and only a very few individuals within an entity are aware that they exist. 
 
Side agreements appear to be prevalent in high technology industries, 
particularly the computer hardware and software segments. The terms they 
provide may preclude revenue recognition (AICPA, 1999). 
 
Illegitimate Sales Transactions 
This relates to recording fictitious sales involving either unreal or real 
customers with fake/incorrect invoices, which are recorded in one reporting 
period (overstatement) and reversed in the next reporting period (Rezaee, 
2002). 
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Improper Revenue Recognition – Contract Accounting 
This involves the inappropriate use of the percentage of completion method of 
accounting for long-term contacts. The management overestimates or 
misrepresents the percentage of completion when the project is less complete 
than the amount reflected on the financial statements and is often corroborated 
by fabricated documents (Rezaee, 2002). 
 
Improper Related-Party Sales Transactions 
“Related-party sales transactions” refers to a financial link or other relationship 
between the company and the customer (Pesaru, 2002). The reason the 
company uses this technique for boosting revenue is because the related-parties 
usually are difficult to identify. The undisclosed related-party transactions may 
be used to fraudulently inflate earnings.  
 
A typical example includes the recording of sales of the same inventory back 
and forth among affiliated entities that exchange checks periodically to 
“freshen” the receivables, and sales with commitments to repurchase (AICPA, 
1999). 
 
This type of fraud is usually found in unusual material transactions, particularly 
close to year-end. The other way for a company to mislead the users of 
financial statements is to present a series of sales, which are executed with an 
undisclosed related-party that individually are insignificant, but in total are 
material (AICPA, 1999). 
 
This “accounting trick” is the big challenge to the auditor and requires 
professional scepticism. Any significant, unusual, or highly complex 
transaction resulting in revenue recognition that is executed with customers, 
who are not related parties, needs special consideration. Again, this fraudulent 
revenue recognition scheme requires the “substance over form” questions to be 
examined.  
 
Channel Stuffing 
Channel stuffing (also known as trade loading) is a marketing practice that 
suppliers sometimes use to boost sales by inducing distributors to buy 
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substantially more inventory than they can promptly resell. Inducements to 
overbuy may range from deep discounts on the inventory to threats of losing 
the distributorship if the inventory is not purchased (AICPA, 1999). 
 
Distributors and resellers sometimes delay placing orders until the end of a 
quarter in an effort to negotiate a better price on purchases from suppliers that 
they know want to report good sales performance. This practice may result in a 
normal pattern of increased sales volume at the end of a reporting period. An 
unusual volume of sales to distributors or resellers, particularly at or near the 
end of the reporting period, may indicate channel stuffing.  
 
Channel stuffing without appropriate provision for sales returns is an example 
of booking tomorrow’s revenue today in order to window-dress financial 
statements. Channel stuffing may also be accompanied by side agreements with 
distributors that essentially negate some of the sales by providing for the return 
of unsold merchandise beyond the normal sales return privileges. Even when 
there is no evidence of side agreements, channel stuffing may indicate the need 
to increase the level of anticipated sales returns above historical experience. 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
Financial statement fraud is defined in different ways, but the common 
definition includes: it is an illegitimate act, committed by management, and 
injures other parties through misleading financial statements. The auditor’s 
responsibility to detect fraudulent financial statements relates to the detection 
of material misstatements caused by fraud and is not directed to the detection of 
fraudulent activity in itself. 
 
The audit risk model is designed for carrying out audits and requires auditors to 
use their judgment in assessing risks. In the process of assessing risks, auditors 
should consider the risk factors of financial statement fraud.  
 
The earnings management issues are of great concern to accounting and 
business professionals, especially given the relationship of these issues to the 
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spectacular financial statement fraud cases of the last decade. Improper revenue 
recognition, one form of earnings management, is found to be the most 
common abuse by management in order to achieve their earning targets. The 
various schemes of revenue recognition fraud include bill-and-hold sales 
transactions, timing of revenue recognition, side agreements, illegitimate sales 
transactions, improper revenue recognition – contract accounting, improper 
related-party sales transactions and channel stuffing. 
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4 Case Analysis. Why Auditors Have Not Detected 
Fraud? 
 
In this chapter we will analyse the three cases of financial statement fraud on 
improper revenue recognition. The analysis will be based on the theoretical 
framework we presented in Chapter 3. From the findings of the analysis we will 
derive the reasons why the auditors have not detected the fraud. 
 
4.1 Introduction to Three Case Studies 
 
We chose three companies, Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam Corporation and 
Xerox, for our case studies. They had been leading companies in their fields 
with high stock prices on the NASDAQ (Lernout & Hauspie) and New York 
Stock Exchange (Sunbeam and Xerox). Lernout & Hauspie was in the IT 
industry, Sunbeam is a consumer products producer and Xerox is a technology 
innovator in the document management business. Under the pressure of Wall 
Street analyst expectations, earning targets as well as management incentives, 
they all used false accounting to mislead investors. We first review the basic 
facts for the three companies, in the order mentioned above. 
 
It can be said that Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products N.V (L&H) is a typical 
example of a company making up its books, i.e. its reported revenue in the 
economically depressed situation of the IT industry. The company used various 
tools to boost its income in the financial statements.  
 
L&H was a Belgian corporation formed in 1987. It operated as a developer, 
licensor and provider of speech and language technologies. The company was 
listed on the NASDAQ in 1995 and its auditor was KPMG.  
 
The stock price of L&H was pretty high in early 2000 until the SEC became 
suspicious of a sudden surge in L&H’s sales in South Korea and its links with 
thirty start-up companies that in total provided substantial revenue in the 
company’s reports (Maremont and Eisinger, 2000). Not very long after the 
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decision of the SEC to investigate L&H, the company announced its “wrong 
accounting” in 1997, 1998 and 1999, and said the financial reports of those 
years would be restated. In 2002, the SEC sued the company with the charge of 
“fraudulent” on its financial statements.  
 
While L&H acts in the software industry, Sunbeam Corporation (Sunbeam) is a 
representative of the manufacturing industry. Sunbeam is a US maker of 
consumer products such as small appliances and camping gear, with a history 
dating back to 1910.  
 
The Sunbeam fraud story started in July 1996, when Albert J. Dunlap, so-called 
“Chainsaw Al,” was hired by Sunbeam’s Board to restructure the financially 
ailing company. Together with the principal financial officer, Russell A. Kersh, 
Dunlap promised a rapid turn-around in the company’s financial performance. 
Working with three other top officers, they then employed improper accounting 
techniques to manage earnings, until the fraud was discovered in 1998.  
 
According to the SEC, the earnings management seemed to begin innocently 
enough in the first quarter of 1997 with the usual “channel stuffing” at the end 
of the period to inflate the revenue results. But then the company had to run 
faster and faster just to stay even. The channel stuffing, explained more fully 
below, deteriorated from a normal business practice to means of improper 
revenue recognition. 
 
The company was audited by Arthur Andersen, who authorised unqualified 
audit opinions on the 1996 and 1997 financial reports. Presently, Sunbeam is in 
a reorganization proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U. S. Bankruptcy Code. 
 
Xerox is a US document company, founded in 1906, which provides an array 
of innovative document solutions, services and systems including color and 
black-and-white printers, digital presses, multifunction devices and digital 
copiers, designed for offices and production-printing environments 
(www.xerox.com, 2002). 
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Xerox was a leading technological innovator for most of the last half of the 
20th century. But by the late 1990s, the company was confronting intense 
product and price competition from its overseas rivals. As a result, increasing 
revenues and earnings became more difficult. To improve operating results, 
Xerox disguised its true operating performance by using undisclosed 
accounting manoeuvres, most of which were improper, that accelerated the 
recognition of equipment revenue by over $3 billion and increased earnings by 
approximately $1.5 billion throughout the years from 1997 to 2000, according 
to the SEC accusations. Xerox’s auditing firm from 1971 to 2001 was KPMG, 
which was replaced by PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2001.  
 
4.2 Analysis of the Three Cases 
 
Our analysis of the three financial statement fraud cases is based on the 
structure by Rezaee (2002). He determines the five interactive factors that 
explain financial statement fraud cases (see Figure 2, p. 36). These factors are 
cooks, recipes, incentives, monitoring and end results, with the acronym of 
CRIME. The summary of the cases is presented in Table 3, p. 65. 
 
4.2.1 Cooks 
 
The first letter of Crime is C, which stands for Cooks. In most of the cases, the 
people who participate in financial statement fraud are senior management such 
as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), 
directors, etc. In L&H, the cooks were the CEO and other top executives. In 
Sunbeam, the cooks were Chairman and CEO Albert J. Dunlap, and four other 
executives: the principal financial officer, controller, and two vice-presidents. 
The SEC also sued the partner of Arthur Andersen for being aware of the fraud, 
but still issuing the unqualified audit opinion. In the Xerox case, the cooks were 
the former chairman, former president, and former CFO. 
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Figure 2. Financial Statement Fraud Interaction.  
Source: Rezaee (2002, p. 62). 
 
4.2.2 Recipes  
 
The second letter in Crime is R, which stands for Recipes. Recipes are 
fraudulent schemes, which the management of the companies have used for 
their cooking (Rezaee, 2002). Recipes vary from case to case. In the following 
sections, we illustrate typical recipes which L&H, Sunbeam and Xerox took. 
We will discuss the fraudulent schemes with regard to improper recognition of 
revenue only. 
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4.2.2.1 Lernout & Hauspie Recipes 
 
Improper Related-Party Sales Transactions 
L&H has used the related-party transactions with insufficient disclosure to 
create its revenue. By using “related-party transactions,” apparently L&H had 
successfully covered the auditor’s eyes.  
 
According to the SEC complaint (Litigation Release No. 17782, October 2002), 
between 1996 and 1999, L&H entered into some engagements with two 
Belgian entities: Dictation Consortium N.V. (Dictation) and Brussels 
Translation Group N.V (BTG) . L&H later admitted in the SEC filings that 
Dictation had been a related party of L&H. Transactions between L&H and 
these two companies were arranged to allow L&H to fraudulently claim 
revenue from its own research and development activities, which otherwise 
would not have been recorded as revenue unless and until the projects resulted 
in marketed products, as the SEC said. L&H improperly recorded over $60 
million in revenue from transactions with these two entities.  
 
To accomplish all this, L&H had the following transactions with Dictation 
(SEC Litigation Release No. 17782, 2002): 
 
• At the very date of creation of Dictation in 1996, L&H signed a $5 million 
agreement with Dictation in which L&H gave Dictation license for certain 
technology and the right to develop applications from the technology.  
• Around three months later, L&H entered another contract with Dictation. In 
this contract, Dictation agreed to pay L&H $25 million to develop software 
using the technology previously licensed to Dictation. The contract gave 
L&H an “option” to buy back from Dictation the rights to the license and 
any software developed.  
• This resulted in recognising revenue of L&H from its software development 
with Dictation of $7.5 million (24% of reported revenue); $18.9 million 
(19% of reported revenue) and $0.3 million (under 1% of reported revenue) 
in 1996, 1997 and 1998, respectively. Therefore, the total revenue for three 
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years in a row that L&H derived from transactions with Dictation was $26.7 
million ($7.5 million plus $18.9 million plus $0.3 million). 
• In the middle of 1998, before L&H developed any marketable product for 
Dictation, L&H acquired Dictation for $43.3 million.  
 
From the illustrated transactions, the following hypothetical accounting journal 
entries in summary form are constructed to explain the L&H situation:  
 
Dr. Receivable from Dictation  $26.7 m 
 Cr. Sales (1996, 1997, 1998)   $26.7 m 
 
Dr. Dictation acquisition   $43.3 m 
Cr. Receivable from Dictation   $26.7 m 
 Cr. Premium     $16.6 m 
 
From the above accounting journal entries, it appears that L&H purchased the 
product of its own research and development at an excess of $16.6 million. 
 
The questions here would be whether the establishment of Dictation was for the 
purpose of L&H to record the false revenue, which in fact were “loans;” and 
whether the transactions were conducted at arm’s length. 
 
The same process happened with BTG (SEC Litigation Release No. 17782, 
2002): 
 
• Similarly, on the date of its creation, BTG signed an agreement on licensing 
valued at $3.5 million, which was then amended to increase the amount of 
the licence fee to $5 million.  
• Later on, another contract on research and development services was signed 
at $30 million. L&H recognised totally throughout 1997, 1998 and 1999 for 
its revenue with BTG $15 million (15% of reported revenue) and $18 
million (8.5% of reported revenue) and $2 million (under 1% of reported 
revenue), respectively.  
• In the middle of 1999, L&H purchased BTG for $42 million.  
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We construct the following hypothetical accounting journal entries in summary 
form to explain the L&H situation: 
 
Dr. Receivable from BTG  $35 m 
 Cr. Sales (1997, 1998, 1999)   $35 m 
 
Dr. BTG acquisition   $42 m 
 Cr. Receivable from BTG   $35 m 
 Cr. Premium     $  7 m 
 
The situation is exactly the same with BTG. The revenue recognised by L&H 
actually were disguised “loans” as the SEC complained. This kind of 
recognition does not comply with GAAP, and therefore L&H did materially 
overstate its revenues in these years. 
 
Illegitimate Sales Transactions 
When the deals with Dictation and BTG were accomplished, L&H initiated a 
new game to boost its reported revenue. L&H created new customers named 
“Language Development Companies” (or LDCs) which were established with 
different actual roles at the time of their creation. All LDCs were private 
companies, incorporated in Singapore, although they had no actual operations 
in that country. The “managing director” of many of the Singapore LDCs was a 
Belgian national associated with L&H, as revealed by the investigation of the 
SEC. 
 
In its annual report, L&H disclosed that the LDCs were formed to develop new 
markets for L&H technology by licensing the company’s basic code-generating 
software to start-up entities in different parts of the world. These entities were 
supposed to then develop speech recognition and translation software 
applicable to various regional languages. In actual fact, the LDCs were little 
more than shell companies created, like Dictation and BTG, as a means for 
L&H to improperly fabricate revenues (SEC Litigation Release No 17782, 
2002). The LDCs had few employees, and were dependent upon L&H 
personnel for research and development activities. None of the LDCs produced 
any significant products. 
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L&H arranged for others to supply financing for some of the LDCs. For 
example, in 1999, L&H asked an investment bank to seek investors for two 
LDCs. The investment bank advanced L&H $8 million for technology licenses 
for the LDCs. The agreement tied L&H’s obligation with the understanding 
that L&H would repurchase the licenses at a substantial premium if the 
investment bank was unable to locate investors to fund the LDCs. 
 
Hence, the SEC proclaimed that, to the extent L&H obtained funds from the 
LDCs, some or all of these funds were subject to material conditions, imposing 
on L&H significant potential liabilities which were not reflected on its balance 
sheet, and which L&H did not disclose to its shareholders. Under those 
circumstances, the accounting applied to the LDCs did not comply with GAAP. 
These creations enabled L&H to recognise of $110.5 million in license fees and 
prepaid royalties from the LDCs in 1998 and 1999, giving the false impression 
of growth (SEC Litigation Release No. 17782, 2002).  
 
Side Agreements Made by L&H South Korea  
Between 1999 and 2000, L&H reported approximately $175 million in sales 
revenue from its South Korean operations (L&H South Korea), the majority of 
which was fraudulent, as the SEC claimed. 
 
This sale was considered “fraud” because of following factors (SEC Litigation 
Release No 17782, 2002): 
 
• L&H South Korea entered into oral and written side agreements with 
customers in which they gave them no definite payment obligation. 
• L&H South Korea made up the uncollectibility of the receivables resulting 
from some of these fraudulent sales by factoring the receivables to South 
Korean banks. 
 
From all the above-mentioned schemes, we find that recognition revenue of 
L&H in these cases does not comply with US GAAP in which “recognition of 
revenue” is defined emphatically as “recognised when earned.” 
 
Financial Statement Fraud  Case Analysis.  
Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud 
 
 
 
41
4.2.2.2 Sunbeam Recipes 
 
According to the SEC’s complaint (Litigation Release No. 17710, September 
2002), the executives employed improper accounting techniques and 
undisclosed non-recurring transactions to misrepresent Sunbeam’s operation 
results. As a result, Sunbeam’s financial statements and press releases reporting 
quarterly and year-end 1997 results, and first-quarter 1998 results were 
materially false and misleading. More specifically, various fraudulent schemes 
were alleged by the Commission, as described below. 
 
Bill and Hold Sales: Improperly Recognised Revenue  
To boost income in 1997, the executives caused Sunbeam to recognise revenue 
for sales, including “bill and hold sales,” that did not meet applicable 
accounting rules (SEC Litigation Release No. 17710, 2002). In the 
manufacturing industry, recognition of revenue critically depends on ownership 
of products or title to the goods held. The “ownership” which is not determined 
precisely in sales contracts or agreements is the trick that companies use to 
cook their books. This was successfully, if fraudulently, applied by executives 
of Sunbeam. In total, Sunbeam fraudulently booked $62 million of its reported 
$189 million in the fiscal year 1997; and at least $7.1 million “wrong booking” 
resulted from improperly recognised revenue on bill-and-hold sales.  
 
How did Sunbeam do this? Sunbeam had agreed with one wholesaler that they 
(the wholesaler) would hold barbecue grills without accepting any of the risks 
of ownership and that the wholesaler could return all of the merchandise if it 
did not sell products. The wholesaler did hold Sunbeam barbecue grills, but 
actually returned all of the grills to Sunbeam during the third quarter of 1997. 
This technique is a classic “bill and hold sale.” Essentially, there was no sale by 
Sunbeam. 
 
This practice is not in compliance with US GAAP, which does not allow 
recognition of revenue on transactions lacking economic criteria. In this 
situation, Sunbeam recorded the sale of the barbecue grills even though title 
had not passed to the wholesaler, and the wholesaler had the full right of return. 
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Channel Stuffing 
Also in 1997, Sunbeam executives used “channel stuffing” to make its reported 
revenue look good (SEC Litigation Release No. 17710, 2002). And they did not 
disclose that revenue growth was, in part, achieved at the expense of future 
results. Sunbeam had offered discounts and other inducements to customers to 
sell products immediately that otherwise would have been sold in later periods, 
a practice known as “channel stuffing.”  
 
Sunbeam’s improper accounting and channel stuffing in 1997 created the 
illusion of reduced results in 1998. In early 1998, the executives took 
increasingly desperate measures to cover the company’s increasing financial 
problems. They again caused Sunbeam to recognise revenue for sales that did 
not meet the applicable accounting rules and to engage in acceleration of sales 
revenue from later periods. Sunbeam further misrepresented its performance 
and future prospects in its official first quarter report of 1998, in its press 
releases, and in its communications with analysts (SEC Litigation Release No. 
17710, 2002).  
 
4.2.2.3 Xerox Recipes 
 
Timing of revenue recognition: Lease agreement 
Since Xerox manufactures expensive capital machines, subject to rapid 
obsolescence, the company sells most of its products and services under 
bundled lease arrangements. This means that Xerox entered long-term lease 
agreements in which customers paid a single negotiated monthly fee in return 
for the equipment, service, supplies and financing. Xerox refers to these 
arrangements as bundled leases and the monthly payment as “Total Cost of 
Ownership” (Xerox Annual Report, 1998). Bundled lease transactions 
constituted the majority of its sales revenue. 
 
In 1990s, the executives of Xerox took advantage of this type of transaction to 
accelerate its leasing revenue to recognise revenue immediately at the expense 
of future periods.  
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As alleged by the SEC (Litigation Release No. 17465, April 2002), Xerox 
repeatedly and improperly changed the accounting policy for recording lease 
revenue from the mid 1990s to 2000. This means that Xerox booked and 
recognised immediately revenues from leases of Xerox equipment that, under 
Xerox’s historical accounting practices, would have been recognised in future 
years. These accounting changes pulled forward nearly $3.1 billion in 
equipment revenue and pre-tax earnings of $717 million from 1997 through 
2000, as the SEC claimed. Xerox never disclosed in its financial statements that 
these gains were a result of accounting changes only, not from operational 
performance.  
 
There is nothing wrong in Xerox’s decision to change its accounting policies 
for recognising revenue so long as GAAP principles are followed. However, it 
is necessary to disclose the impact of this change since it has material impact 
on the decision making of the investors. Apparently, Xerox management had 
played games with concept of “recognition revenue.” This violated US GAAP 
requirements that material changes in accounting methods must be disclosed 
separately from normal operating income. 
 
4.2.3 Incentives  
 
The third letter in Crime is I, which stands for Incentives and explains the 
typical reasons and motivations why companies and their cooks have engaged 
in financial statement fraud (Rezaee, 2002).  
 
In all the three cases, L&H, Sunbeam and Xerox, there were enormous 
pressures on the management to meet the expectations and forecasts of the 
analysts. Like many other companies, these three companies faced the 
economic pressure to achieve their targets, show steady growth and perform 
better and better all the time in order to keep the investors happy and increase 
their market value.  
 
As for the auditors, they were also under the pressure of retaining their clients. 
All of the studied companies were large and certainly the auditors faced the risk 
Financial Statement Fraud  Case Analysis.  
Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud 
 
 
 
44
of losing their top clients if they did not come to agreement with regard to 
questionable, even irregular, accounting practices. Unfortunately this situation 
with an external auditor, anxious to retain a client, leads too often to an 
auditor’s failure to resist client pressures.  
 
In many cases another strong incentive to manage earnings is executives’ 
bonuses tied to company’s performance. The bonuses for chief executives were 
very high, in these cases, although in the case of Sunbeam, the executives did 
not gain from the boosted stock market price, as they held their options and 
stock (SEC Litigation Release No. 17710, 2002). The main incentive behind 
the Sunbeam’s fraudulent activities seems to be hidden in the personal 
character of the CEO Albert J. Dunlap who was the turn-around manager of 
Sunbeam.  
 
A normal tendency of a turnaround manager at a new assignment is to overstate 
the problems (“A Corporate Rambo in Trouble,” 1998). The executives might 
say that things in reality are much worse than they were told or believed when 
they first took the job. After that, even slight improvements seem like major 
events. In Dunlap’s case, with his desire for publicity and inflated self-image, 
he promised more than was reasonable and set himself up for a fall. When 
Dunlap arrived at Sunbeam, he announced a plan within three months that 
included eliminating 50 per cent of the company’s 12,000 employees, selling 
39 of its 53 facilities, divesting several lines of businesses, and eliminating 6 
regional headquarters in favour of a single one in Florida. (“A Corporate 
Rambo in Trouble,” 1998). He had promised to turn the company around and 
he was not going to fail. In fact, Dunlap’s turn-around formula was phoney, and 
it left no room for ethics.  
 
4.2.4 Monitoring  
 
The fourth letter in Crime is M, which stands for Monitoring. Responsible 
corporate governance and the presence of adequate and effective internal 
control systems are the most important factors in preventing and detecting 
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financial statement fraud (Rezaee, 2002). Lack of monitoring of the top 
management by the board of directors is evident in all the three cases.  
 
Sometimes too much trust between those entitled to check (board of directors 
and the company audit committee) and those to be checked (management) can 
be a contribution to fraud. In Sunbeam’s case, the CEO had very friendly 
relations with the principal owner of the company and the board (although the 
friendship ended when the actual fraud was discovered). The same was true in 
L&H’s case, when the founders of the company were indeed themselves 
engaged in the fraud.  
 
External auditors have a significant role in monitoring the company. But the 
external auditors’ ability to detect fraud is somewhat limited to the extent of 
internal control system of the company (Rezaee, 2002). There is a possibility 
that in these cases auditors were probably to some extent aware of the 
misstatements of the financial figures, but under the environment of lack of 
oversight from the board and audit committee, decided they were not material.  
 
4.2.5 End Results  
 
The last letter in Crime is E, which stands for End Results. Financial statement 
fraud always has consequences, even if it is not detected.  
 
4.2.5.1 Lernout & Hauspie 
 
L&H has ceased to exist as an operating company. It has filed for bankruptcy 
protection. Investors in Belgium, the United States and elsewhere suffered a 
loss of at least $8.6 billion dollars in market capitalization. The former CEO, as 
well as two founders and co-chairmen, were arrested and charged with fraud; 
another top executive is under investigation (German, 2001). After reviewing 
L&H’s actual sales figures for Singapore and South Korea, auditor KPMG sued 
L&H for trying to subvert an audit that KPMG conducted into the company’s 
operations (German, 2001).  
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4.2.5.2 Sunbeam 
 
Public investors who bought and held Sunbeam’s stock in anticipation of a true 
turn-around lost billions of dollars. 
 
To settle the SEC charges, Dunlap and Kersh agreed to permanent injunctions 
against ever violating federal antifraud statutes, and permanent barring for each 
of them from serving as officers or directors of any public company. They also 
agreed to pay a civil penalty of $500,000 for Dunlap and $200,000 for Kersh. 
In addition, Dunlap had paid $15 million and Kersh $250,000 to settle 
Sunbeam class-action suits (SEC Litigation Release No. 17710, 2002). 
Nevertheless, they did not admit or deny any wrongdoing.  
 
Three other former executives and Sunbeam’s former accounting partner from 
Arthur Andersen have refused to settle the SEC charges and are to be tried in 
January 2003 (SEC Litigation Release No. 17710, 2002). 
 
The new management dismissed the independent auditor, Arthur Andersen, in 
1998 and replaced them with Deloitte and Touche LLP. Arthur Andersen paid 
$110 million to settle claims but did not admit fault or liability (Weil, 2001).  
 
4.2.5.3 Xerox 
 
The stock price of Xerox has dropped 63% from a 2002 high of $11.45 
(January 29, 2002) to the lowest of $4.20 (November 10, 2002) (New York 
Stock Exchange, 2002). The company has lost many of its customers to the 
competitors since the time the fraud issues were discovered (Byrnes and 
Bianco, 2002). 
 
The SEC has warned KPMG and the partner who headed its audit of Xerox that 
it may file civil charges against them. Xerox has agreed to pay a $10 million 
civil penalty and to restate its financial accounts back to 1997 after booking 
false revenues (Greenemeier, 2002).  
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4.2.6 Detection 
 
Having dissected each case, we find that auditors had not taken their 
responsibilities fully for detecting fraud. The detection of fraud in these three 
cases came from the public press, various analysts, and the SEC, rather than 
from the auditors who are supposed to be the first to detect fraud. Looking back 
to L&H, the fraud story was discovered by an investigative team set up by The 
Wall Street Journal in 1999 since the team found the figures of L&H’s financial 
statements did not make sense any more. A series of articles followed, 
suggesting that the CEO had cooked the books. In August 1999, following 
“discrepancies” between his explanations and the findings of the Journal’s 
reporters, the CEO of L&H was forced out of his job. A month later, the SEC 
launched its own investigation. (“Business: Translation Errors,” 2000). Very 
soon after the statement of L&H about its “wrong accounting” on its financial 
statements, on November 17, 2000, KPMG, as auditor of the company, 
announced its intention to withdraw its audit report of the company’s 1998 and 
1999 results, saying its prior clean opinion of the software maker’s books 
“should no longer be relied upon” (Maremont, 2000). With the scandals of 
Xerox case, its auditor KPMG (which was replaced by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers in October 2001) has recently become the subject of 
an SEC investigation. This situation resulted when a few other companies, for 
which KPMG audited and provided financial services, came under the SEC’s 
suspicion of fraud.  
 
In the Sunbeam case, several media reports questioned the company’s 
performance and restructuring strategies in 1998. The critical article, 
“Dangerous Games” was published by Barron’s, a Dow Jones & Company 
magazine, in June 8, 1998. The article examined the company’s financial, 
production and quality problems, analysed the financial statements and 
declared that Dunlap had cooked Sunbeam’s books. After the story, Sunbeam’s 
board fired Dunlap as chairman and chief executive officer. Shortly thereafter, 
the SEC started the investigation (Laing, 2001).  
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After cases and cases of fraudulent financial statements, an obvious question is: 
“Where is the auditor? Why they did not discover the fraud?” 
 
In order to understand why the auditing firms in these cases have not detected 
the various frauds, an examination and discussion of both technical and ethical 
issues are required. We are going to analyse these issues in the next section. 
 
4.3 Reasons Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud 
 
In this section, we are not trying to judge or criticize any auditors who audited 
the companies accused of committing false accounting. Instead, we want to 
find the underlying reasons why the auditors in these cases did not discover the 
fraud.  
 
The increasing number of cases of financial statement fraud makes the 
professionals worry about the quality of audit work, i.e. its methodology and 
approach. The issue of how audits are done has been a source of concern at the 
SEC. In his 1998 letter to the AICPA, the former SEC Chief Accountant, Lynn 
Turner, said, “The recent combination of changes in the audit process and high-
profile financial frauds have raised questions about the efficacy of the audit 
process” (Brown, 2002). 
 
On the technical side, it is not an easy task to find the reasons behind why 
auditors (in the cases where fraud has been proven) have not detected the fraud. 
In theory, GAAP should have prevented most of the abuses in the studied 
cases. But the standards created by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
are merely guidelines – and are subject to interpretation. That’s where the 
auditors are supposed to come in. But even officials of the AICPA say the 
auditors have to ensure only that a company’s financials are in accordance with 
GAAP (Greenberg, 1998). In all the cases, the auditors’ (and company’s) first 
answer to the accusation of fraud was: everything was in accordance with 
GAAP. And although some auditors have agreed to pay fines, they never 
agreed to any wrongdoing.  
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Beasley, et al. (2001) summarised the SEC enforcement actions against 
auditors in the period from 1987 to 1997. These showed the top ten audit 
deficiencies made by auditors. The most common problem was the auditor’s 
failure to gather sufficient audit evidence. The SEC also alleged the auditors 
failed to apply GAAP pronouncements, or applied them incorrectly. In 
addition, audit programme design was an issue. Lack of professional 
scepticism, over-reliance on inquiry as a form of audit evidence, deficiency in 
confirming accounts receivable, failure to recognise related-party transactions 
and assuming internal controls exist when they may not, are the main audit 
problems which the SEC considered. 
 
Next we discuss the most critical problems – analytical review procedures, risk 
assessment in relation to the audit risk model, failure of applying GAAP in 
“revenue recognition,” as well as “recognition of related-party transactions” 
and conflict of interest issues – which have been highlighted by the accounting 
literature (Beasley, et al., 2001, Cullinan and Sutton, 2001). In order to find the 
reasons why auditors have not detected the fraud in the studied cases, we 
compare and analyse the above-mentioned problems with the information 
available about the auditors involved in the cases we studied.  
 
4.3.1 Analytical Review Procedures Used as “Sufficient Audit 
Evidence” 
 
The withdrawal of the audit report of KPMG in the L&H case implied that, to 
some extent, the auditors had not obtained the sufficient evidence for their 
conclusion. In some measure, the insufficient evidence resulted from the audit 
approach itself (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001).  
 
Due to the time constraints, cost benefits and value-added services, the audit 
approach has been modified to overcome these audit problems. The “great 
discovery” in the audit process in 1988, which has opened the floodgates to 
auditors, was the acceptance that analytical procedures were capable of not 
only being used in the planning of an audit, but also were now a valid 
substantive testing procedure (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001). Therefore, the audit 
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seemed to constitute the combination of testing the internal control system and 
the analytical review, with minimum substantive testing performed. 
 
A survey conducted by Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham in 1989, which 
was taken by KPMG Peat Marwick partners who had encountered management 
fraud, disclosed that 61% of the fraud cases were discovered through 
substantive tests while only 19% were discovered through analytical review 
procedures (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001).  
 
The analytical review procedure involves much “professional judgment.” This 
means whilst auditing the balances of items, auditors have an expectation of 
how the accounts should be. Referring to the “analytical procedure,” 
International Standards on Auditing No. 520.17 (1998) released by 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), we find stated that “the 
expected effectiveness . . . of an analytical procedure . . . depends on . . . the 
reliability of the data used to develop the expectation . . . (and) the precision of 
the expectation.”  
 
In conjunction with the cases we studied in last section, L&H’s auditor is an 
example of the auditors putting their trust too high in the client data. Soon after 
the fraud story of L&H was discovered by The Wall Street Journal and the 
resulting SEC probe decision, KPMG defended themselves by accusing the 
former top management of L&H of lying about the key business structures 
within the company and giving false information (Conlin, 2001).  
 
It is precisely the problem that auditors have to trust in the information that the 
client provides. However, when applying only analytical procedure, excessive 
trust is too risky for auditors since such a level of trust depends highly on the 
reliability of the data given. 
 
In addition, the analytical review procedure seems to emphasise investigations 
of “fluctuations” in the account balances, especially the analysis of 
discrepancies from the previous years (both budget and actual figures) (Brown, 
2002). If the explanations of the discrepancies reasonably correspond to the 
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current business events “happening” in the company, through the observation 
of the auditors, it is likely that less testing work is performed.  
 
We put “happening” within double-quotes because it is common sense that 
management who falls to the temptations of fraud, obviously tries to hide the 
“real situation” by making the accounts look normal. For example, the 
management discloses to auditors that in this year no critical issues occurred. 
The orientation of the management is to manipulate the financial statements to 
make them look similar to past years. Therefore, the auditors, with their 
analytical procedures, attempt to present evidence supporting the contention 
that everything is fine since no discrepancies with prior year financial 
statements are detected. This false interpretation can occur because it depends 
greatly on professional scepticism of the auditor (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001).  
 
There is another difficulty for auditors in applying analytical procedure. Most 
big companies have a long history of engagement with their auditor partners. 
We have discussed above that the analytical procedure involves many 
judgmental issues. The interpretation of findings is also affected somehow by 
the “independence” factor, which we are going to discuss in a separate section. 
The longer the auditors are engaged with their clients, the more loose the 
“professional scepticism” of the auditors could be. Once the auditors attempt to 
persuade themselves that the figures in the financial statements of their clients 
are fine, the interpretation for their analysis drives them in a manner toward 
supporting the conclusion, which they want to reach (Brown, 2002). Therefore, 
even in some cases where the auditors might have smelled something not 
satisfactory in the financial report, they did not consider digging it out.  
 
Xerox’s auditor is a good example of misuse of analytical procedures. KPMG, 
as auditors, had been with Xerox since 1971 until replaced by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 2001. KPMG has been criticised by the press (for 
example, Kay, 2002, Maremont, 2000, and Conlin, 2001) for not taking enough 
responsibility for Xerox’s accounts. It was said that Xerox’s manipulations 
should have been easy to detect if there was anyone interested in looking. The 
revenue numbers made up from the “lease agreement” are so large that “it’s 
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akin to auditors driving past Mount Everest and saying they never saw it.... 
Corporate America has somehow gotten into the mindset that this is OK” (Kay, 
2002). If one examines the annual reports of Xerox from 1995 throughout 
2000, that comment is not too exaggerated. The revenues gradually and 
continuously increased from $16,588 million in 1995 to $19,228 million in 
1999. It looks as if the “cooks” had put a certain percent of growth in each year. 
Assuming the auditors used the analytical procedures to investigate those 
consecutive increases in sales, from comparing the figures from year to year, 
the auditors would have noticed the increase and wondered about what had 
been going on. However, due to the constraints we discussed before in the 
chapter, the auditors allowed the situation to continue. KPMG did not say 
anything, even when they were fired by Xerox. 
 
Analytical procedure applied to sales accounts normally involves the 
comparisons of recorded amounts, or ratios developed from the recorded 
amounts, to expectations developed by the auditor. This means that the auditor 
would use a variety of sources, including the financial information from 
comparable previous periods, budgetary results, and information regarding the 
industry in which the client operates, within the client’s normal business 
practices regarding sales and distribution in order to develop the auditor’s 
expectation (AICPA, 1999).  
 
We will look into the cases, which we have studied, beginning with Sunbeam. 
In the last section of Sunbeam’s “recipes” we wrote that Sunbeam was blamed 
by the SEC for taking advantage of “bill and hold sales” to increase its reported 
revenues in 1997. The company executed an “incomplete contract” with its 
wholesaler to record about $7.1 million revenue in 1997. In the contract, 
Sunbeam had agreed that the wholesaler would hold barbecue grills without 
accepting any of the risks of ownership and that the wholesaler could return all 
of the merchandise if it did not sell products. The wholesaler did hold Sunbeam 
barbecue grills, but actually returned all of the grills to Sunbeam. The auditor 
might have detected this fraud if they warily examined the contract simultane-
ously with the inventory stock count at the year-end. In this situation, the 
analytical procedures would have not helped the auditor in detecting the fraud.  
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It is a similar situation with L&H’s South Korea case. The company entered 
side agreements with customers who were not obliged to make definite 
payment. By this procedure, L&H recorded $175 million revenue in 1999 and 
2000. Although we described in Chapter 3.6 that the side agreements are often 
hidden from the external auditors, the auditor can still detect the fraud by 
performing further testing. For instance, in this case, the auditor could check 
whether the customer had made the payment in the subsequent year. With a 
further examination of the annual reports of L&H for the years ended 1997, 
1998 and 1999, it is impressive that the revenues, (consisting of sales of 
technologies and solutions; applications; and consulting and services) 
especially of technologies and solutions were increasing rapidly: from $ 99,371 
million in 1997, to $ 211,592 million in 1998 and to $ 344,237 million in 1999. 
It means the revenues increased more than three times within two years. It 
could be that the auditors here have not addressed the revenue growth question 
with this sort of enormous increase in sales.  
 
It is possible that the auditors in those cases did perform the analytical 
procedures, for instance, comparing this year’s ratios to the previous year’s, 
this quarter’s to the last quarter’s, etc., but it is possible that they did not bring 
their judgment of comparisons to the actual situation of market and business in 
which their clients were operating. The reason behind that could be that the 
auditors put their trust too high in the data provided by the management. 
“Channel stuffing” and “improper timing of revenue recognition” is often 
identifiable by using analytical procedure. But here we emphasize again, it 
depends to a great extent on the interpretation of discrepancies by the auditors. 
In the case of Sunbeam, according to its annual reports (1997, 1998) its sales in 
1997 increased significantly as compared with 1996, whilst the cost of sales 
actually decreased. Conversely, the sales in 1998 decreased compared with the 
previous year, whereas the cost of sales increased. This shows that the company 
did allocate their expenses in 1998, which should have been recorded in 1997. 
While the analytical procedure technique works to identify discrepancies, 
however, it is in the hands of the interpreter to explain such differences.  
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4.3.2 Weaknesses of Audit Risk Model and Risk Assessment 
 
Accompanying the innovation in the audit risk model of the 1980s, most of the 
main international public accounting firms have deliberately tailored their audit 
methodology in compliance with GAAS to improve the cost effectiveness of an 
audit and to focus on the value-added services for clients. These re-engineered 
audit processes generally focus on a client’s business processes and on an 
evaluation of the information systems used by the client to generate financial 
information (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001). 
 
Therefore, according to Brown (2002) auditors these days have gradually 
focused more on how companies generate their financial data, the 
computerised bookkeeping programmes, and the internal controls that are 
supposed to act as a check on the system, rather than on the numbers 
themselves. That is in contrast to the older style of auditing, under which 
accountants dissected corporate accounts deeply, looking at thousands of 
transactions to determine if the bookkeeping was correct. The shift in the way 
accountants audit their clients’ books can be traced to two developments dating 
from the early 1980s. First, companies increasingly turned to computers to 
manage their finances. Second, intense competition caused the fees for auditing 
to fall as much as 50% from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. That forced 
auditors to cut costs themselves, and they did it by cutting back on the labour-
intensive process of sifting through dozens, or even hundreds, of corporate 
accounts. In order to be more efficient, the auditors put more reliance on 
internal controls, which allowed them to do less work on account balances and 
transactions. 
 
The auditor’s reliance on internal controls has been criticised as a weakness in 
the audit procedure. The perspective of most accounting firms regarding the re-
engineered audit approaches is that fraud is something lower level employees 
are responsible for (Cullinan and Sutton, 2001). In essence, the internal control 
system is established to control the lower level employees rather than the upper 
management. It hardly works as an effective control system at the management 
level since the control system is built by the management themselves to 
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scrutinise their inferiors only. Beasley, et al. (2001) summarised the report of 
the AICPA ASB, 2000 titled “Fraud-Related SEC Enforcement Actions 
Against Auditors: 1987-1997” on accounting and auditing financial statement 
fraud instances announces that in most of the cases the very top levels of 
management, i.e. CEO or equivalent level, are the conductors of the “fraud 
story.” Our case studies with Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox in the 
“Cooks” part in our previous section also support this conclusion. The question 
here will be raised whether the transformation in the audit process, which 
focuses on risk assessment of internal control system, is the right direction 
regarding fraud detection. The problem becomes more critical since in most 
international organisations as big as L&H, Sunbeam and Xerox, the controls 
and systems should be effective and adequate.  
 
Since the top management never creates the controls and systems to monitor 
themselves, the fraud committed by top management is only left for the audit 
committee and the auditor to detect. The reform in the audit process, which 
emphasizes internal control systems, has worsened the possibility of top-level 
fraud detection.  
 
In the three cases we studied, we found it is truly hard for auditors to detect the 
“cooking” with this audit approach, especially with “earnings management” 
fraud. For instance, in the L&H case, the company is accused of having 
manipulated its accounting books from 1996 and 1999 by using its related 
parties to record sales (improper related-party sales transactions) and creating 
its start-up companies in other countries to boost its revenues. Detection of this 
sophisticated earnings management is unlikely unless the auditor has dug into 
the single, unusual transactions. Obviously it would take substantially extra 
time while assuming the auditor already performed tests of control and assessed 
the system was fine in earlier stages of the audit (Brown, 2002). The fear of 
double work and over-auditing is the main concern for auditors in this aspect of 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Principally the internal control system and the risk assessment have to be 
evaluated and upgraded every audit year since there could be changes in the 
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structure and business of the company. Once the control system of the company 
is considered to be effective enough to be relied upon, the auditor has to 
perform a substantial test of controls and a “walkthrough review1.” When the 
result of the test of controls gives a “yes,” as being effective for most of the 
critical control points, the auditor could draw the conclusion that the control 
system is “effective and reliable” and risk is assessed as low or moderate in the 
audit planning stage. Then the substantive tests should be minor in the audit 
execution stage. Although it is a must to evaluate the system every year, it 
could be the case that professional judgment and scepticism might diminish 
gradually once the auditor becomes too close with management and does not 
imagine that management would dare to falsify their books. At this moment, 
the auditor still assesses the control system of his or her client as effective and 
reliable, whilst in fact it no longer is. The danger here is that the failure in 
assessing the system of the company will lead to the inappropriate audit 
programme design. As the AICPA ASB investigation determined, audit 
programme design was a problem cited in 44% of cases studied (Beasley, et al., 
2001). Audit programme design requires the auditors to consider the risk 
factors while engaging with their clients in order to identify these sorts of risks. 
 
4.3.3 Audit Failure in Revenue Recognition and Related-Party 
Transactions Disclosure 
 
Recent investigations have revealed that the audit failures in revenue 
recognition have increased. The study of the AICPA ASB, as summarised by 
Beasley, et al. (2001), in the enforcement actions stated that almost half of the 
cases investigated showed the auditors failed to apply GAAP or applied it 
incorrectly, especially in revenue and related-parties’ accounts. 
 
It is true that revenue recognition issues continue to pose significant audit risk 
to auditors. In some instances, auditors fail to correctly apply the accounting 
                                          
1 Review to obtain an understanding of some aspects of the accounting system and certain 
control activities of the company. To perform the review, one or a few transactions within 
each major class of transactions is traced, and the related control policies and procedures are 
identified and observed (Boynton and Kell, 1996). 
Financial Statement Fraud  Case Analysis.  
Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud 
 
 
 
57
rules of revenue recognition. The criteria for revenue recognition based on 
existing accounting rules say that companies should not recognise revenue until 
it is realised or realisable and earned. According to the SEC, the revenue will 
only be recognised when a number of criteria has been met, including (Phillips, 
Luehlfing and Daily, 2001):  
 
• persuasive evidence of an arrangement;  
• delivery occurred or services rendered;  
• seller’s price fixed or determinable; and  
• collectibility reasonably assured. 
 
While these criteria are general, they provide guidance for revenue recognition 
relating to most traditional business models. The companies that do not employ 
traditional business models, such as e-commerce compa-nies and companies 
with a large percentage of Internet transactions, are the challenges to auditors in 
deciding when and how the revenue should be recorded, although extra 
guidance of revenue recognition is provided by the SEC Staff Accounting 
Bulletin (SAB) No. 101 (Beasley, et al., 2001).  
 
We return to the case of L&H, a software developer. The SEC made the 
accusation that transactions between L&H and two Belgian companies, 
Dictation and BTG, in fact were sort of “loans” since L&H claimed revenue 
from its own research and development activities, which otherwise would not 
have resulted in reported revenue unless and until the projects resulted in 
marketed products. Apparently in this case, the auditors did not detect the false 
sales recorded by its client since the sales had not met the criteria of “delivery 
occurred.” 
 
According to Beasley, et al. (2001), related parties’ accounts, as alleged by the 
SEC, is another common problem for the auditor to fail to recognise or disclose 
transactions with related parties. The SEC found that the auditor was either 
unaware of the related party or appeared to cooperate in the client’s decision to 
conceal a transaction with this party. Such transactions often resulted in inflated 
asset values. 
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Having looked back to the case of L&H, it is found that the company in its 
financial reports from 1996 to 1999 did not disclose any information suggesting 
that Dictation was a related party. The company only admitted the relationship 
when the SEC made its probe of the company’s financial figures. It could be 
the risk for auditor that the company did not provide sufficient information for 
the auditor to decide whether they are related parties or not. L&H also is under 
suspicion with its operation relations with the 30 LDCs, “start-up companies” 
in Singapore, which enabled L&H to recognise of $110 million in license fees 
and prepaid royalties in 1998 and 1999.  
 
Revenue recognition and related-party issues are certainly risky areas for 
auditors (AICPA, 1999). In some cases, the auditor fails to apply the 
accounting principles appropriately. It could be the result of lack of 
involvement of audit partners in the audit engagement. In addition, it could be 
the consequence of revenue recognition and related-party transactions too 
broadly defined in GAAP.  
 
4.3.4 Conflict of Interest Issues 
 
In recent years, particularly 2002, there has been discussion on the issues of 
conflict of interest, particularly on auditor independence and non-audit services 
offered by auditors to their clients. We find these issues connected to the 
reasons why auditors have not detected financial statement fraud. In the next 
section, firstly, we will discuss auditor independence – its relationship with the 
auditee and time and cost constraints. Secondly, we will write about the non-
audit services. 
 
4.3.4.1 Auditor Independence 
 
Pressures by Auditee’s Management (Who Pays the Bill?) 
There has been plenty of discussion about auditors’ independence in the 
financial literature. Some authors argue (Greenberg, 1998, Bazerman, Morgan 
and Loewenstein, 1997) that auditors can never be independent, because of the 
current system, where auditors are hired and paid by the organizations that they 
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audit. That is the first apparent conflict. The company is free to change the 
auditors, who do not agree with its accounting practices. Therefore there are 
auditors who choose to close their eyes for the fear of being fired.  
 
The study of the cases revealed that the auditors did find out some of the 
irregularities, but could not resist client pressure and perhaps relied too much 
on the management statements. KPMG is blamed in the Xerox case because the 
auditing firm knew the problem, which had been going on in the entity, but 
they did not speak up (Bandler and Maremont, 2002). Instead, KPMG resigned 
when the management of Xerox asked for a new engagement partner.  
 
Time and Cost Constraints 
If auditors suspect material financial statement fraud, GAAS requires them to 
conduct appropriate fraud investigation procedures (or to withdraw from the 
engagement). According to Caplan (1999), these actions require considerable 
effort, because auditors can no longer rely on client-prepared schedules2 or 
management representations3. If auditors’ suspicions are unjustified, the fraud 
investigation can damage the client relationship, and an honest client might not 
compensate the auditors for their additional effort. On the other hand, failure to 
detect fraud can be quite costly to both the company and the auditor.  
 
The auditors’ decision on how much effort to expend investigating for fraud 
should be based on their assessed risk of fraud. However, it is difficult to assess 
this risk. Also, routine audit procedures may not distinguish between errors and 
fraud, since most audit exceptions result from errors; and the auditor’s prior 
beliefs are weighted in that direction. Consequently, even when fraud is the 
actual cause of an audit exception, the auditor may simply assign an error 
interpretation, and the fraud will not be detected. (Caplan, 1999). 
 
 
                                          
2 Schedules, prepared by the client upon the requirement of the auditor in order to facilitate 
audit work. 
3 Assurance from company’s management to the auditor that the management provides all 
information that they consider relevant to auditor (FTMS, 2001). 
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Relationship Between the Auditor and the Auditee 
Too close relations between the auditor and the auditee can be a source of 
potential conflict of interests. For example, when a company hires their 
previous auditor as a top manager and the same auditing firm continues to audit 
the company, there is apparently too close a relationship and a possible conflict 
of interests (Rezaee, 2002). As a result, an auditor might lack the professional 
scepticism always required.  
 
In the Xerox case, the auditor KPMG audited the company for thirty years. It is 
possible that the auditors had too close a relationship with the auditee.  
 
4.3.4.2 Non-Auditing Services 
 
Today, auditors collect more fees for non-auditing services than from tra-
ditional audit services. These non-audit services include bookkeeping, 
technology design and implementation, approval or valuation services, actuarial 
services, and internal audit services (Rezaee, 2002).  
 
There are two main fears concerning the non-audit services and auditor’s 
independence. First, non-audit service fees make auditors financially dependent 
on their clients, and hence less willing to stand up to management pressure for 
fear of losing their business. Second, the consulting nature of many non-audit 
services puts auditors in managerial roles, potentially threatening their 
objectivity about the transactions they audit. (DeFond, Raghunandan and 
Subramanyam, 2002). 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we discussed two main issues. The first part dealt with three 
case studies: Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox, which we have chosen 
to examine because of their fraud in the financial statements. We analysed the 
cases according to the factors with the abbreviation of CRIME, which stands 
for “Cooks”, “Recipes”, “Incentives”, “Monitoring” and “End Results”. For the 
summary of the case study, see Table 3, p.65.  
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In the second part, we discussed some causes, for why the auditors in the 
studied cases did not detect fraud. They are analytical review procedures; risk 
assessment in relation to the audit risk model; failure to apply GAAP in 
“revenue recognition,” and “recognition of related-party transactions” and 
conflict of interest issues. 
 
The application of analytical procedures is insufficient because the analytical 
procedures employ too much professional judgment. In addition, these 
procedures rely on the data and information given by the company 
management, who, if tempted toward fraud, could fool the auditors.  
 
Risk assessment process with audit risk model is also the cause. Over-reliance 
on internal control weakens the capability for detecting fraud (Brown, 2002). 
The internal control is built up by management to monitor employees, not 
themselves. A matter of fact is that in most of the fraud cases, top management 
is both conductor and creator of the fraud story. Therefore, if in the audit 
process, auditors focus on internal control, it only enhances the ability of 
finding errors at the lower employee level.  
 
Revenue recognition and related-party issues are the most risky areas for 
auditors (AICPA, 1999). In some cases, the auditor fails to apply the 
accounting principles appropriately, although they have not admitted that their 
audits have not complied with GAAS.  
 
One more reason which is critical and controversial in the professional world is 
the conflict of interests issues. This is represented through the auditor 
independence problem and the sales of non-auditing services by auditors.  
 
The pressure of being paid by the management of the auditee as well as the 
time and cost constraint might affect the auditor’s judgments. The relationship 
between the auditor and its auditee creates the image of eroding independence  
in the public eye. The auditor apparently cannot help fearing losing its clients.  
 
Financial Statement Fraud  Case Analysis.  
Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud 
 
 
 
62
The higher profit margin obtained from the non-auditing services than from 
traditional audit services stimulates auditors to expand their various non-
auditing services to serve their clients. It is a question of conflict of interests 
again because, on one hand, the auditor assists the company in upgrading its 
control system, for instance, and on the other hand, the auditor is also the one 
who examines the system. 
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5 Recommendations For Improving the Audit Process 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It does not make sense for any research project to have the researchers spend 
pages on finding the reasons which caused the issues, and yet not give any 
suggestions or solutions for these problem issues. Therefore, in this chapter, as 
the result of our study, we present various comments and ideas directed toward 
finding such solutions, based upon the interviews with the auditors and the 
research done by the US accounting professionals. The solutions for a more 
effective audit procedure in order to enhance the audit quality have become the 
core topics in the accounting profession recently. They draw much attention 
from academics and professionals as well as various accounting and auditing 
authorities.  
 
The endeavour to improve audit quality has a practical meaning to auditors who 
now really need to recover their image, which has been partly damaged in the 
public’s eyes due to the increasingly high profiles of fraudulent financial 
statements exposed.  
 
Two programmes focusing on improvement of the audit process and the 
enhancement of detection of fraud in financial statements were launched 
recently. Both programmes originate from the USA and apply to the companies 
using US GAAP. The first one is the Panel on Audit Effectiveness (also known 
as the O’Malley Panel) which was implemented by the Public Oversight Board 
(POB) in October 1998. The Panel was established in response to a request by 
the SEC over its concern for improving audit quality. The Panel conducted a 
comprehensive review and evaluation of the way independent audits of 
financial statements of publicly traded companies are performed and assessed 
the effects of recent trends in auditing on the quality of audits and on the public 
interest. On the basis of the research, the Panel made several recommendations 
to improve the conduct of audits and governance of the profession. The final 
report and recommendations were issued on August 31, 2000. 
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The Panel’s recommendations are summarized into the following areas:  
 
• Conduct of audits, including the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of 
fraud; 
• Leadership and practices of audit firms; 
• Effects on auditor independence of non-audit services provided to audit 
clients; 
• Governance of the auditing profession; 
• Strengthening the auditing profession internationally. 
 
The second programme is the Exposure Draft (ED) of a proposed Statement on 
Auditing Standards, “Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit,” 
which was issued by the AICPA ASB on February 28, 2002. This statement 
would supersede SAS No. 82. In essence, the ED does not change any of the 
auditor’s current responsibilities for fraud in a financial statement audit. 
However, it introduces new concepts, requirements and guidance to assist 
auditors in meeting those responsibilities in an audit of financial statements 
conducted in accordance with GAAS (Montgomery, et al., 2002).  
 
In this thesis, we have no ambitions to discuss the whole procedure for 
improving the audit process. Instead we focus on the practical ways in applying 
analytical procedure, risk assessment, avoiding audit failure in applying 
accounting principles, and conflict of interest issues. To be practical and 
objective, we have asked accounting firms in Sweden for their advice on the 
improvement of the audit process. The suggestions we give here are a 
combination of our interpretation resulting from the research and 
recommendations by professional institutions, AICPA and POB. The 
recommendations are summarised in Table 4, p. 80. 
5.2 Empirical Findings 
 
In order to conduct our research and obtain an extended understanding of the 
topic we contacted several audit companies in Gothenburg, Sweden.  
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First we sent a preliminary e-mail (see Appendix 1) to nineteen of the Swedish 
audit companies located in Gothenburg, as well as to the Swedish Professional 
Institute For Authorised Public Accountants (FAR), to ask their consent to 
answer our questionnaire. Next we telephoned the companies and got contacts 
with ten. To those who agreed to answer the questionnaire, we sent it by e-mail.  
 
Eight of the companies declined to answer the questionnaire. The main 
response was that the person responsible did not have enough time to deal with 
it. PriceWaterhouseCoopers responded that they cannot answer those types of 
questions. FAR’s answer was similar: 
 
“… The questionnaire consists of numerous very broad and open 
questions, some of which cannot be answered without extensive 
explanations and reservations. Furthermore, some of the questions 
on complicated professional issues ask us to state the institute’s 
opinion, which can be done only after full due process. We regret, 
therefore, that our resources do not allow us to respond to your 
questionnaire.” 
It seems the topic is too sensitive, and since Swedish GAAS does not include 
the fraud consideration, some auditors (especially smaller firms, who do not 
audit international companies) do not have an opinion on the issues. The two 
audit companies we had interviews with were Ernst & Young AB and KPMG 
Bohlins AB: a personal interview with Ernst & Young and an e-mail interview 
with KPMG.  
Next we present the outcome of the interviews with Ernst & Young and 
KPMG.  
 
5.2.1 Conduct of Audits 
 
Concerning the conduct of audits, Bengt Petersson from KPMG Bohlins replied 
that they try to audit the processes to get an opinion how effective the processes 
are to avoid financial fraud. Dan Brännström from Ernst & Young AB said that 
their current audit procedures are not 100% effective. Swedish GAAP does not 
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include detecting fraud and thus auditors in Sweden are not looking for fraud. 
Although, when auditing the clients listed in the US stock markets, they have to 
include fraud issues. They have to fill out the checklist of questions on fraud, 
designed by the company.  
 
Answering the question about the use of analytical review as the “conclusive 
audit evidence,” both interviewees suggested that the analytical review must be 
supplemented with substantive testing of important balance sheet items. 
Brännström added that they often start with an analytical review. After 
conducting the review, they decide with which substantive tests they have to 
complement it.  
 
To the question “What do you do to protect yourself from the possibility of re-
ceiving false information given by the management?” Petersson answered that 
it is a big problem. He added that the auditor has to trust in the information 
given by their client and in order to achieve good auditing, there must be trust 
between the auditor and the top management in the company: “We must be-
lieve that the information we receive is correct.” Petersson believes that KPMG 
has effective systems to detect “false information.” Brännström said that all 
companies are different and have different internal control levels. If the auditor 
cannot rely on the internal control system and accounting policies of the 
company, he/she must rely on analytical procedure. If the auditor is not certain 
about the management information, he/she has to conduct his/her own tests.  
 
In order to detect false information, which might exist in revenue and related 
accounts, one of the procedures suggested by Brännström is comparing the 
sales of each month with the budget. If there is deviation, they ask questions 
and make judgments about the answers.  
 
When asked what was the most important task for an auditor, even beyond the 
analysis and comparison of the figures, Brännström suggested the following: 
“To ask the questions is the most important.” The auditor should consider 
himself a journalist, he added.  
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Regarding the revenue recognition issues, Brännström answered that it is likely 
that there is no right or wrong answer for when or how the revenue is realised 
and earned, especially in an IT company. As an example, one of the Swedish IT 
companies, Prosolvia AB, went bankrupt. The investigation of Prosolvia is 
underway, however, and the auditor is suspected of having made mistakes in 
detecting the “revenue recognition” fraud. This is similar to the case of L&H, 
which was also operating in the IT industry.  
 
Lastly, Brännström suggested that in order to detect fraud the auditor should 
make changes every year on the audit work approach. The recommendations 
are to vary the audit, change the members of the audit team, and do new sorts 
of testing. All this helps an auditor to look at the client from a different angle 
and reveal new issues.  
 
5.2.2 Auditor Independence/Non-Audit Services 
 
According to Brännström, in the eyes of general public and stakeholders, ex-
tended non-audit services threaten the independence of audit firms. This is why 
the new regulations concerning minimizing non-audit services are advisable. 
Nevertheless, it really doesn’t threaten a person’s independence as an auditor, 
because on making the decision and signing the auditor’s report, he/she is on 
his/her own and wants to be as independent as possible. Petersson argues that 
some non-audit services can affect auditor’s independence. KPMG has a sys-
tem to avoid these problems. They have a checklist, and if there are any con-
flicts found they will withdraw from consulting. The similar system is in Ernst 
& Young, where they have to document any conflict of interest. If necessary, 
they ask for a second opinion from outside parties and/or stop certain 
consultancy work.  
 
5.2.3 Internal Controls 
 
Regarding the internal control system assessment, Petersson stated that the 
system assessment must be evaluated and upgraded every year. A company is a 
living process and its programmes can be affected for many reasons, for in-
stance, new management or owners, new accounting system, new personnel 
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and new policies. However, Brännström argued that the internal control as-
sessment might depend on the client. Nevertheless, in order to update the inter-
nal control assessment, the auditor has to carry out additional tests. If the audi-
tor wants to rely on the internal controls of the company, he or she has to make 
a large number of test of controls and walkthrough reviews. If not, the auditor 
must make substantive tests. Also, the auditor should focus every year on 
different processes.  
 
5.2.4 Effect of Audit Risk Factors on Audit Procedures 
 
We asked the interviewees to state which risk factors they consider to be the 
ones that most change their ordinary audit procedures. Petersson replied that 
the main risks are accompanied with the company’s anxiety to meet the results: 
 
• The company has problems with the result;  
• The result is far below the budget; 
• The price of the shares will fall when the result is published and to avoid the 
fall the top management can “fix” the result. 
 
Alternatively, Brännström’s main risk factors are concerned with changes in 
the company’s attitude: 
 
• New owners that may implement new accounting principles; 
• New management, especially that the CEO may also make changes; 
• New attitude towards internal control and audit work. 
 
After identifying the risk factors, the following changes in the audit procedures 
are suggested by the interviewees: 
 
• More analytical reviews; 
• Identify unusual accounting transactions by the end of the accounting period 
(Petersson). 
• More audit work to be more observant; 
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• More substantive testing to find out if changes in the company’s accounting 
are reasonable (Brännström). 
 
5.2.5 Audit Rotation and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
The new legislation in the USA (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, July 30, 2002) requires 
the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the 
audit every five years. We asked the interviewees’ opinion whether this 
regulation strengthens auditor independence. 
 
Petersson replied that if you are an auditor for a long time there can be a risk 
that the independence can be affected and he hopes that the rule helps to en-
hance auditor independence. On the other hand, Brännström thinks that this 
rule strengthens auditor independence only in the eyes of general public and 
stakeholders. In auditing a new company, the first year is not effective, because 
an auditor has to make himself or herself acquainted with the company to really 
understand its business. The best year for auditing is said to be the third.  
5.3 Suggestions from the Existing Research 
 
5.3.1 Analytical Procedures 
 
As we have discussed in the last section, where we asked the question, “why 
auditors have not detected fraud,” it has been suggested that “analytical 
procedure” does not provide enough evidence for the auditor upon which to 
base an opinion. The main reason is because the procedure depends greatly on 
the interpretation of findings and the professional scepticism involvement of 
the issues. The interpretation of findings is directly affected by the information 
and data given by the client. This procedure is hardly considered as effective in 
detecting financial fraud at the top management level since the management, 
with their temptation to commit fraud, could fool auditors cleverly.  
 
As we mentioned before, analytical procedure involves much “judgment.” Only 
auditors can do it. There is nobody who can judge the judgment of auditors. 
Despite the fact that there is the audit committee, its members often may not 
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have the expertise in the technical issues that auditors do, and some people 
serving on audit committees have very little accounting or financial background 
at all (Bean, 1999). In order to overcome this subjectivity, the auditor should 
use analytical procedure as a tool to identify areas that may represent specific 
risks relevant to the audit, such as the existence of unusual transactions and 
events, and amounts, ratios, and trends that might indicate matters that have 
financial statement impact. When the auditor finds any unusual events in the 
accounts, based on analytical procedures, the auditor decides immediately to 
extend the detailed testing. This is a comment from the Ernst & Young 
interviewee.  
 
In its study “Audit Issues – Revenue Recognition” (1999), AICPA presents 
some guidelines on what kind of analysis the auditor should conduct in order to 
be more effective with analytical procedure in the sales account:  
 
• The most effective and common analysis the auditor should do is to 
compare monthly and quarterly sales by location and by product line with 
sales of the preceding comparable periods and for comparable periods in 
prior years. This comparison will consider whether the results are consistent 
with other known information, such as expanding or declining markets, 
changes in sales price mix, and new or discontinued product lines. To 
identify some of the unusual transactions which might happen at the year 
end, the auditor can compare revenues recorded daily for periods shortly 
before and after the end of the audit period, looking for unusual fluctuations, 
such as an increase just before and a decrease just after the end of the 
period. 
 
• The comparison of gross profit ratio, overall and by product line, to 
previous years and to budget, considered in the context of industry trends, is 
also the common tool to use.  
 
• To identify the “channel stuffing,” the auditor can compare the number of 
weeks of inventory in distribution channels with prior periods for unusual 
increases. The comparison of revenue deductions, such as discounts and 
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returns and allowances, as a percentage of revenues with budgeted and prior 
period percentages for reasonableness in light of other revenue information 
and trends in the business and industry could identify the “bill and hold 
sales.” The comparison of sales credits for returns subsequent to year end 
with monthly sales credits during the period under audit to determine 
whether there are unusual increases may indicate contingent sales or special 
concessions to customers. 
 
In an article entitled “Auditors’ New Procedures for Detecting Fraud,” 
(Montgomery, et al., 2002, p. 64) the authors commented that “Forensic experts 
know inquiry is a highly effective tool in fraud investigations and that people 
who are reluctant to volunteer information about known or suspected fraud will 
more likely do so when asked directly.” The suggestion of expanded inquires is 
also encouraged by the recent AICPA Exposure Draft. The ED requires 
auditors to query management on its views of the risks of fraud in the entity 
and knowledge of any known or suspected fraud. It is good for auditors to ask 
not only the management, but also others, for example, individuals outside the 
entity’s accounting or financial reporting areas or employees with varying 
levels of authority. However, the questions should not be too difficult. The 
nature and extent of these inquiries would be based on the auditor’s 
professional judgment and generally directed to employees with whom the 
auditor comes into contact during the course of the audit (Wells, September 
2001).  
 
Combining the suggestions of auditors interviewed with the existing studies on 
analytical procedure for sales, in our opinion, in order to make analytical 
procedures effective, there should be supplementary substantive tests 
performed. We also believe that making inquiries is an effective tool for 
auditors to detect fraud as well. 
 
5.3.2 Risk Assessment 
 
The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is an ongoing 
process (Heim, 2002). Risk assessment processes such as planning, assessing 
risk, and gathering and evaluating evidence should be continuous throughout 
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the audit rather than only performed in separate phases of the audit. Fraud risk 
factors may come to the auditor’s attention while performing procedures 
relating to acceptance or continuance of clients, during engagement planning, 
in obtaining an understanding of a client’s internal control, or while conducting 
fieldwork. Other conditions identified during field work may change or support 
a judgment regarding the assessment, such as unavailability of other than 
photocopied documents, or situations when auditors are denied access to 
records, facilities, certain employees, customers and/or vendors from whom 
audit evidence might be sought (Heim, 2002).  
 
Understanding the Fraud Triangle 
There are three conditions generally present when fraud occurs – 
incentive/pressure, opportunity and attitude/rationalization (see Figure 1, “The 
Fraud Triangle,” p. 25). The concept is also explained in the ED (described in 
section 5.1). Understanding and considering the likeliness of fraud in the 
context of these three conditions will enhance the evaluation of information 
about fraud (Montgomery, et al., 2002). This will provide the auditor with more 
professional scepticism when assessing fraud risk. Auditors are advised to 
consider the client’s receptiveness to fraud, regardless of the auditor’s past 
experience with the client or prior assessments about management’s honesty 
and integrity (Heim, 2002).  
 
Evaluation of Programmes and Controls 
When the auditor identifies risks of material misstatements due to fraud, the ED 
requires that he or she consider management’s programmes and controls to 
address those risks. They might include broader programmes or specific 
controls designed to prevent, deter or detect fraud. The auditor would consider 
whether such programmes and controls would mitigate or exacerbate those 
identified risks. Also, the auditor would evaluate whether these programmes 
and controls have been suitably designed and placed in operation. The auditor’s 
ultimate assessment of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud would 
take this evaluation into account. (Montgomery, et al., 2002).  
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Further Procedures to Improve Risk Assessment 
Management is in a unique position to perpetrate fraud because it can override 
established controls that would appear to be operating effectively. This risk 
exists in virtually all audits and can occur in a number of unpredictable ways. 
Currently, the auditor’s planned procedures in response to inherent and control 
risks and the auditor’s assessment of the risk of material fraud should consider, 
at least implicitly, the risk of management override (Montgomery, et al., 2002).  
 
The auditor should also consider whether or not audit procedures need to be 
modified. In some cases, even when some of the fraud-risk factors are 
identified as being present, the auditor’s judgment may be that audit procedures 
otherwise planned are sufficient to respond to the risk factors, individually or in 
combination. In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude that the 
conditions indicate a need to modify procedures. The auditor also may 
conclude that it is not practical to modify the procedures sufficiently to address 
the risk, in which case withdrawal and communication to the appropriate 
parties may be appropriate. (Heim, 2002).  
 
Next we will give an overview of the procedures, as proposed by the ED, to 
better address the risk of management override of the controls. 
 
• Examining journal entries and other adjustments  
 
The auditor should understand the auditee’s financial reporting process, 
including automated and manual procedures used to prepare financial 
statements and related disclosures, and how misstatements may occur. This 
understanding provides a basis for determining the nature, timing and extent 
of testing of journal entries and other auditor adjustments for evidence of 
possible material misstatement due to fraud. This testing would be a matter 
of professional judgment and would be based on the auditor’s assessment of 
the fraud risks, whether effective controls have been implemented over one 
or more aspects of the financial reporting process, the nature of the financial 
reporting process and the evidence that can be examined (for example, the 
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extent of manual vs. electronic evidence) and the nature and complexity of 
the accounts.  
 
• Reviewing accounting estimates for bias 
 
Fraudulent financial reporting often is accomplished through intentional 
misstatement of accounting estimates. Existing auditing standards already 
require the auditor to consider the potential for management bias when 
reviewing significant estimates. In addition, the ED requires the auditor to 
perform a retrospective review of significant prior-year estimates for any 
potential bias that might signal inappropriate earnings management (for 
example, recorded estimates clustered at one end of an acceptable range in 
the prior year and at the other end of an acceptable range in the current 
year).  
 
• Evaluating the business rationale for significant unusual transactions  
 
Companies extensively use complex business structures and sophisticated 
transactions, especially transactions involving special purpose entities or 
related parties. The auditor has to place emphasis on understanding the 
rationale behind such unusual transactions. Unusual transactions are those 
that come to the auditor’s attention that are outside the normal course of 
business for the company or that otherwise appear unusual. 
 
5.3.3 Audit Failure in Revenue Recognition and Related-Party 
Accounts 
 
There are various ways which are suggested for auditors to avoid audit failure 
in applying GAAP in revenue recognition and related-party accounts. 
Regarding revenue recognition issues, the recommendations specifically tell 
auditors to be aware of changes in revenue growth trends, non-standard journal 
entries (particularly at the end of the reporting period) and side agreements that 
might affect proper revenue recognition (Phillips, et al., 2001). Once the 
auditors are aware of this issue, the auditors are able to open the question as to 
whether this recognition complies with GAAP.  
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It is suggested by Wells (September, 2001) that an auditor can identify the 
fraud in sales and receivable accounts by comparing financial statements over a 
period of time. Various questions are included in his study. The more “yes” 
answers, the more likely there is something more for the auditor to consider. 
Some examples of his questions are:  
 
• Is the company negotiating financing based on receivables? 
• Have receivables grown significantly? 
• Have receivables increased faster than sales? 
• Is the ratio of credit sales to cash sales growing? 
• Compared with sales and receivables, has cash decreased? 
• Compared with sales, has the cost of sales fallen? 
• Have shipping costs dropped, compared with sales? 
• Has accounts receivable turnover slowed? 
• Are there unusually large sales toward the end of the period? 
• Have there been substantial sales reversed in the first period following the 
increase? 
 
In the study of “Audit Issues – Revenue Recognition” by AICPA in 1999, it is 
also advised that the auditor should understand the entity’s business: how it 
earns revenue, who is involved in the revenue process, how it controls the 
possibility that revenue transactions may be overridden, and what the 
motivation to misstate revenue may be.  
 
Auditors need to be aware that transactions with related parties usually require 
special consideration because related parties may be difficult to identify and 
related-party transactions may pose significant “substance over form” issues. 
Undisclosed related-party transactions may be used to fraudulently inflate 
earnings. In order to cope with this potential problem, “significant, unusual, or 
highly complex transactions resulting in revenue recognition that are executed 
with customers who are not related parties similarly require special 
consideration” (AICPA, 1999). The reason is because they may also pose 
“substance over form” questions and may involve the collusion of the entity 
and the customer in a fraudulent revenue recognition scheme (AICPA, 1999). 
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There are very few procedures which are guided by AICPA for auditors to 
consider the transactions with their client’s related parties. The guidance 
emphasizes that the auditor should consider whether he or she has obtained 
sufficient competent evidential matter to understand the relationship of the 
parties and the effects of related-party transactions on the financial statements. 
 
Furthermore, in order to avoid this failure, the auditing firm should have its 
partners seriously involved in the engagements where some judgments need 
both experience and knowledge in the issues (Landen, 2001), especially 
“substance over form” in the case of related parties transactions since it is the 
partner who signs off the auditor’s report. The training of the staff is necessary 
and should be taken seriously in order to make the audit team aware of the 
importance of the issue. 
 
5.3.4 Conflict of Interest Issues 
 
5.3.4.1 Auditor Independence 
 
Independent auditors should provide reasonable assurance that the audited fi-
nancial statements are free of material errors and fraud. In order to effectively 
accomplish this responsibility, auditors should be objective, impartial, and un-
biased toward the client, investors, creditors, and other users of financial state-
ments (Rezaee, 2002). However, if the auditor has too close a relationship with 
the auditee, this can threaten his independence (Rezaee, 2002). Therefore we 
address several new rules and recommendations, which deal with this concern.  
 
The new legislation in the USA (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, July 30, 2002) requires 
the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner to rotate off the 
audit every five years. The rule is believed to help to alleviate the possible 
independence threats for the auditors, as in so little time as five years, too close 
ties between the company and the auditor are less likely to occur.  
 
Another rule in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is “Restrictions on employment of 
auditor personnel.” This is to prohibit registered public accounting firms from 
providing audit services to clients whose CEO, CFO, or chief accounting 
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officer was employed by the audit firm and participated in the issuer’s audit in 
any capacity within one year of audit initiation. 
 
This rule is really what an audit firm has to consider. When a top manager of an 
auditee has worked with the auditor before, the relationship is apparently too 
close and there is a possibility of conflict of interests. The recommendation to 
the auditors is to consider seriously every potential threat on their independence 
and, if necessary, to ask for a second opinion from independent outside parties. 
If there are any conflicts of interest found, the audit work should be abandoned. 
 
5.3.4.2 Non-Audit Services 
 
There are controversial views on the effect of the non-auditing services on the 
independence of the auditor. The regulatory authorities in the USA (SEC) are 
concerned about the amount of non-auditing services performed by auditors 
and have taken steps to minimize the range of these services. 
 
However, according to the study by DeFond, et al. (2002), contrary to 
regulators’ concerns and general opinion, there cannot be found any association 
between non-audit service fees and the auditor’s inclination to issue a going 
concern opinion. In addition, they found no relation between audit fees and the 
auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern opinion. The findings suggest that 
market-based institutional incentives, such as reputation loss and litigation 
costs, promote auditor independence and outweigh the economic dependency 
created by higher fees.  
 
Cote (2002) argues that an auditor’s ability to resist client pressure depends on 
the firm’s dependence on the client, whether from size, amount of fees, or the 
services it provides. The greater the dependence, the stronger the pressure. 
Moreover, the smaller the accounting firm compared to the client, the more 
vulnerable it is to pressure. Pressure may be associated with any service, 
including audit. There is no way to avoid it, as long as auditing is a commercial 
transaction.  
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Different opinions described above on non-audit work reveal that auditors can 
offer the non-audit services. However, an auditing firm should evaluate the 
threats on non-audit services provided thoroughly. One guiding principle for 
evaluating the appropriateness of particular services is whether the services 
facilitate the performance of the audit, improve the client’s financial reporting 
processes or are otherwise in the public interest (POB Panel of Audit 
Effectiveness). 
5.4 Summary 
 
We summarised the findings and suggestions in the following table, so the 
reader can more easily, in a compressed version, find the reasons why auditors 
have not detected fraud as well as the recommendations for how to improve 
this process.  
 
Reasons for not Detecting Fraud 
 
Recommendations/Suggestions 
• Analytical Procedure is 
insufficient for audit evidence. 
 
• Supplemented testing required. 
• Make inquiries. 
• Interpret findings within the context of 
current business and market. 
• Compare of ratios for “bill-and-hold sales,” 
“channel stuffing” and “side agreements.” 
• Risk assessment and Internal 
Control is not absolutely 
effective.  
 
• Vary the audit procedures. 
• Understand auditee’s financial reporting 
process. 
• Review accounting estimates for bias. 
• Understand significant unusual transactions. 
• Audit failure in applying 
“revenue recognition” and 
“related-party transactions.” 
 
• Compare financial statements over a period 
of time. 
• Understand the entity’s business. 
• Understand the relationship of the parties.  
• Partners more involved in the audit 
engagements. 
• Conflict of interest issues is 
controversial.  
 
• Auditor rotation. 
• Restrictions on the employment of the 
auditing staff. 
• System of evaluating the independence 
risks. 
Table 4. Summary of Reasons Why Auditors Have Not Detected Fraud and Suggestions for 
Improvement. 
Financial Statement Fraud                            Summary and Suggestions for Further Research 
 81
6 Summary and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
Financial reporting frauds and earnings manipulation have attracted high 
profile attention of both the professional world and the public. Most people are 
interested in the questions “where auditors are?” and “what is going on with 
audit quality?”. We found it would be interesting to study the problem and 
learn about it.  
 
At the beginning of our research, we set out the research purpose, which 
contains two questions “why auditors have not detected fraud in the financial 
statements?” and “how to improve the audit process to detect these kinds of 
fraud?” 
 
To achieve and fulfil these purposes, we first have studied the theories, which 
are relevant to the area we are researching. The theoretical framework which 
we have studied relates to the subject of financial statement fraud, earnings 
management and revenue recognition problem. In auditing theory technically, 
we studied the audit risk model in the risk assessment process and the risk 
factors of financial statement fraud which auditors should consider.  
 
The theories have given us the concrete base to analyse the case studies, which 
we have selected: Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox. We studied three 
financial statement fraud cases, based on the structure by Rezaee (2002). The 
structure is created to identify the financial statement fraud. It arises from five 
factors: cooks, recipes, incentives, monitoring and end results, which is 
abbreviated as “CRIME.”  
 
In our cases, the “cooks” or the authors of the fraud story were either the CEO, 
CFO or members of senior management. The auditors, KPMG (Lernout & 
Hauspie and Xerox) and Arthur Andersen (Sunbeam) were accused by the SEC 
and public press of either being aware of fraud but still releasing a clean 
opinion or not having discovered the manipulation of their client’s earnings 
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figures. So far, Arthur Andersen paid the fine in the Sunbeam case, but has not 
admitted the fault. 
 
“Recipes” in the fraudulent schemes are the most diversified. They are the 
methods, which the cooks have used. Lernout & Hauspie used three various 
recipes, which were improper related-party sales transactions, illegitimate sales 
transactions and side agreements. Sunbeam’s recipes were bill and hold sales 
and channel stuffing. Xerox was consistent with its one recipe of timing of 
revenue recognition. 
 
“Incentives” are the motivations for why the companies and their cooks have 
engaged in financial statement fraud. Most companies with high growth rates 
like Lernout & Hauspie, Sunbeam and Xerox faced economic pressure to attain 
their targets and meet the expectations of the analysts as well as to keep the 
investor happy. From the auditor’s side, the fear of losing their important 
clients was enlarged in this current highly competitive environment.  
 
“Monitoring” means both internal and external monitoring in and out of the 
corporation. Internal monitoring is represented through the corporate 
governance’s control over the corporate system. External monitoring is 
believed to be done by the independent auditors. The three cases showed us 
there was lack of monitoring of the top management by the board of directors, 
and in Lernout & Hauspie case, the founders of the company themselves were 
involved in fraud. The auditors in these cases did not take their full 
responsibility in playing the role as the external monitor.  
 
The final factor is “End results” or the consequences of the financial statement 
cases. The consequences typically ranged from filing for bankruptcy to 
substantial decline in stock value. The cooks suffered by being forced to resign 
or being fired or being sanctioned with fines or jail sentences. The 
consequences for the auditors, who have not spotted the cooking, were fines 
and loss of their reputation. The investors were the heaviest sufferers on the 
economic side.  
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Having possession of these findings, we studied the reasons lying behind the 
cases why auditors have not discovered the frauds, which answered the first 
question in our research purpose, in both technical and ethical terms. 
Technically, we discussed three main reasons which we found related to our 
case study. They were: application of analytical review procedures as 
“sufficient audit evidence;” weaknesses in audit risk model and risk assessment 
concerning internal control; and audit failure in revenue recognition and 
related-party transaction disclosure.  
 
Regarding application of analytical review procedures as “sufficient audit 
evidence,” the study revealed that the most critical point in analytical procedure 
is the auditor’s failure in interpretation of findings, and the lack of high 
involvement of professional judgment.  
 
The internal control is typically designed by the top management to facilitate 
their monitoring over their employees. The cases revealed that it was top 
management who were the authors of the financial statement fraud. Therefore, 
over-reliance on the assessment of internal control system does not help to 
detect higher-level fraud. Audit failure in detecting revenue recognition fraud 
and related-party issues was also common. These were truly the most 
dangerous areas for auditors. According to the AICPA (1999), the auditor’s 
failure to apply the accounting principles could be the result of either the lack 
of involvement of audit partners in the engagement or too general definition of 
the issues in the GAAP itself.  
 
Conflict of interest issue was the core ethic issue we studied. This involved 
auditor independence and non-audit services. Auditor independence has been 
historically controversial ever since the audit service was born. To some extent, 
audit service is still a commercial industry and the auditors are being paid by 
the companies they audit. Therefore, this is one of the causes of the pressures 
and constraints on the auditors. In addition, in the trend of decreasing or 
standstill audit fees, the auditors have suffered time and cost constraints. 
Another cause for conflict of interest is a too close relationship between auditor 
and auditee. For example, KPMG had thirty years of engagement with Xerox. 
All of these factors might have heightened the suspicion of the auditor’s 
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independence, at least in the public eyes. Non-audit services have exacerbated 
the conflict of interest issue. The auditing firms cannot help neglecting the 
higher profit margin, which consulting and other non-audit services have 
brought to the firms. The audit services in some ways were the base for the 
auditing firm commercialising its other services.  
 
Having answered question one of the research purpose, we suggest some 
solutions or improvements in audit process to address the weaknesses in 
detecting financial statement fraud. In other words, we have answered question 
two of our purpose. The solutions were obtained with the assistance of two 
auditing firms in Sweden, which we collected from our interviews, and the 
existing studies of professional organisations.  
 
Each reason in question one was followed by the suggestions for improvement 
in question two. Turning to the analytical procedure, the study revealed that in 
order to make the procedures effective, supplementary testing should be 
performed, because analytical procedure alone does not provide sufficient 
evidence for audit conclusion. Besides, using inquiries is an effective tool for 
auditors to detect fraud. Inquiries give the auditor additional information to 
interpret the findings in an objective manner. Referring to the sales and related 
accounts, it was also suggested by the AICPA (1999) that some critical ratios 
and procedures should be taken when using analytical procedure. Risk 
assessment is a complex area which requires the high technical skill involved. 
The suggestions from AICPA Exposure Draft are to understand the fraud 
triangle, evaluate programs and controls, as well as take some additional 
procedures to improve risk assessment. Most important, practical and effective 
ways to detect fraud are to make changes every year on the audit approach and 
members of the team, and also to perform new sorts of testing. This definitely 
helps auditors to look at the client from a different angle and expose the 
underneath issues.  
 
To avoid audit failure in revenue recognition and related-party issues, various 
authors’ recommendations were presented. The general suggestions included 
understanding the internal and external usual and unusual changes in the 
entity’s business. The audit partner has to be deeply involved in the audit 
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engagements to identify the risky issues as the partner is usually the one who 
possesses experience and knowledge particularly about the “substance over 
form” issues in the related-parties transactions.  
 
Concerning conflict of interest issues, auditor rotation, under the audit 
independence issue, is the spotlight with the birth of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
July 30, 2002 in the USA. However, the rule might cause some troubles for 
rotated auditors in getting familiar with the client system in the first year. 
Hence the audit quality in the first year might not be very effective in meeting 
the purpose of detecting fraud as expected. In order to prevent auditors from 
overlapping the services between audit and non-audit ones, the suggestions 
given are the restrictions of the employment of the auditing staff and 
consideration of a system of evaluating the breach of independence concept.  
 
We have to restate one of sentences we wrote at the very beginning of our 
thesis. It is “one of the best ways is to profit from the mistakes of others.” It is 
absolutely true. We believe that auditing firms have learnt and been alarmed by 
what their peers have not done. Studying the reasons lying underneath the 
financial statement fraud cases from the auditor’s side, as well as seeking for 
the improvements on the audit process in order to detect fraud, will gradually 
enhance audit quality and recover the trust of the public in auditors. This 
endeavour is apparently on the way to reaching a more effective and efficient 
audit.  
 
6.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
This thesis deals with the financial statement fraud in improper revenue 
recognition area. We suggest that the further study can be taken in the other 
areas of the financial statement fraud such as overstatement of assets other than 
accounts receivable; understatement of expenses/liabilities; misappropriation of 
assets; inappropriate disclosure; and other miscellaneous techniques.  
 
As we mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, we did the research from the 
perspective of the auditor. The other suggestion is that the study can be 
conducted from the perspectives of other responsible persons such as 
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management and government. From the management side, the study would be 
in the light of management in antifraud issues. We suggest the website, which 
might be helpful if there is anyone interested: 
http://www.aicpa.org/antifraud/management.htm. 
 
Although the fraudulent financial statement cases in Sweden in particular and 
in Europe in general are not as many as discovered in the United States, fraud 
cases still exist with the suspected involvement of the auditor. The case of 
Prosolvia AB, a Swedish IT company who went bankrupt, is an example. The 
investigation is on-going. However, the auditor is suspected of having made 
mistakes in detecting “improper revenue recognition” fraud. Our last 
suggestion for further research is to study fraudulent financial statement cases 
in Sweden to find the reasons and the improvements in audit process within the 
framework of Swedish GAAP and Swedish GAAS.  
 
To sum up, our suggestions for further research consist of: 
 
• Study other kinds of fraud; 
• Study from the perspectives of others such as management and government; 
and 
• Study fraudulent financial statement cases in Sweden to find the reasons and 
improvements within the framework of Swedish GAAP and Swedish 
GAAS. 
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Appendix 1  
Cover Letter to the Audit Companies 
 
Dear Sir or Madam,  
 
We turn to you with a request to help us in conducting our Master’s thesis in 
the Graduate Business School in Handelshögskolan, Göteborg University. The 
thesis is entitled “Financial Statement Fraud: Recognition of Revenue and the 
Auditor’s Responsibility for Detecting Financial Statement Fraud.”  
 
We believe the findings of our research could also be useful to you. The main 
purpose of our thesis is to identify the reasons why auditors have not detected 
certain types of fraud, based upon an investigation of several well-known 
fraudulent financial statement cases which involved the overstatement of 
revenue. The second purpose of our thesis is to suggest possible solutions for 
improving the audit process in order to assist auditors in identifying instances 
of overstatement of revenue.  
 
In order to accomplish the research, we would like to ask you some questions 
about the current audit process and your views concerning the possibilities of 
improving that process. We will send you the questionnaire after your consent. 
The questionnaire is relatively brief and will take no more than one hour of 
your time. Of course, all responses will be held anonymously if that is your 
wish. 
 
We hope that your assistance can benefit us mutually. Thank you in advance 
for your time and consideration. We look forward to hearing from you.  
 
Thank you for reading our letter in English. We are from the countries 
of Vietnam and Estonia, and English is our second language, which is the 
language of our Master’s programme. 
 
Yours faithfully,  
 
 
Linh Thuy Do  
Tiina Intal 
 

  
  Appendix 2 
Questionnaire Sent To The Auditing Firms In Sweden 
 
Auditing Procedures Regarding Financial Statement Fraud 
 
1. Conduct of Audits 
 
1.1 There are diverse opinions regarding the issue of improvement of audit 
process for detecting financial statement fraud. The O’Malley Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness1 concludes that “current audit conduct is not ineffective” and “ 
the audit risk model is appropriate,” but some enhancement should be 
implemented. However, another study by Cullinan and Sutton2 criticised that 
the new audit approach which places emphasis on system internal control 
assessment rather than “direct testing of the underlying transactions and 
account balances,” is at odds with the profession’s position regarding fraud 
detection because most material frauds originate at the top levels of the 
organization, where controls and systems are least prevalent and effective.  
 
What is your opinion of these contradictory conclusions? In your 
company, which audit procedures are used in order to detect fraud?  
 
1.2 The key change in the audit process which has been reengineered by most 
auditing firms in the last decade is that analytical review is used as the main 
tool for substantive testing and becomes “conclusive audit evidence.” Cullinan 
and Sutton claim, “The greatest difficulty in the effective application of 
analytical review procedures is in the interpretation of findings.” “However, the 
use of analytical procedures is almost always focused on the analysis of 
differences from the previous years.” They conclude that this methodology is 
                                          
1 The O’Malley Panel on Audit Effectiveness was established at the request of former 
chairperson of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, to study the prevailing audit model in 1998. 
2 Charles P. Cullinan and Steve G. Sutton, from Bryant College and University Of 
Connecticut/University Of Melbourne, School Of Business (U-41a), University Of 
Connecticut Storrs, Ct 06269-1041, USA, have studied “Defrauding the Public Interest: a 
Critical Examination of Reengineered Audit Processes and the Likelihood of Detecting 
Fraud.” 
 
  
not effective in detecting fraud because auditors rarely stop to consider that an 
upper level manager who falls to the temptations of fraud is most likely to 
attempt to cover up such a fraud by making the accounts look normal. 
 
This conclusion reflects the response from auditors in the accounting fraud 
cases discovered recently where auditors usually claimed that the management 
lied about the information structure (Lernout & Hauspie).  
 
1.2 (a) What is your opinion of this argument? What do you do to protect 
yourself from the possibility of receiving false information given by the 
management? 
 
 
1.2 (b) In order to place emphasis on detecting “false” information which 
might exist in revenue and related accounts, do you think it is necessary to 
have extra steps, besides analytical review procedure, in your current 
audit programme for those accounts? If so, which steps should be taken? 
 
1.3 From the recent case studies of fraudulent financial statements, the 
companies boosted their revenue by using “one-time actions,” “one-offs,” 
"accounting opportunities" and "accounting tricks" to achieve earnings targets. 
For instance, pulling forward and recognizing revenues immediately from 
equipment leases that, under company's historical accounting practices, would 
have been recognised in future years (Xerox)3. Other case like Lernout & 
Hauspie used “related-party transactions” as the tool for similar revenue 
falsification. 
 
It seems the companies committing accounting fraud often play tricks 
with the concept of “revenue recognition”4. What is your opinion on this 
controversy?  
                                          
3 Securities and Exchange Commission complaint v. Xerox Corporation, Civil Action No. 
02-272789 (DLC).  
4 SAB 101 spells out the criteria for “revenue recognition” based on existing accounting 
rules, which say that companies should not recognise revenue until it is realised or realisable 
and earned. (Thomas J. Phillips Jr., Michael S. Luehlfing and Cynthia M. Daily, “The Right 
Way To Recognise Revenue,” June 2001, The Journal of Accountancy). 
  
2. Auditor Independence/Non-audit services 
 
There have been a number of discussions on independence of auditors. 
Auditing companies often provide non-audit services (consulting) to their 
clients. For example, auditors collect consulting fees significantly larger than 
audit fees or a company hires an auditor, who was previously the company’s 
audit manager, for its top executive position.  
 
In our opinion, auditors cannot be independent if they provide extended 
consulting services to their clients. 
 
Do you agree with us? How does your company avoid such conflict of 
interests? 
 
3. Internal controls 
 
In the planning stage of a current audit year you, as external auditor, 
assess that the internal control system of the client is effective and the test 
of controls draws the conclusion that it is reliable. As the result, the extent 
of the substantive tests in the executing stage will be minimised. If so, how 
are you going to perform the internal control system assessment in the 
next audit year? Do you upgrade/roll forward the previous year’s 
assessment? If yes, in what way are you going to do it? 
 
4. Effect of audit risk factors on audit procedures 
 
4.1 There are different risk factors, or “red flags” that can indicate 
financial statement fraud. Which are the risk factors which you consider 
would most change your ordinary audit procedures?  
 
4.2 What are the changes in audit procedures you would make after you 
have identified these risk factors? 
 
 
 
  
5. Audit Rotation and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
On July 30, 2002, the president of the USA G. W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. This legislation impacts corporate governance of public companies, 
affecting their officers and directors, their Audit Committees, their 
relationships with their accountants and the audit function itself. The act states 
that the lead audit or coordinating partner and the reviewing partner must rotate 
off the audit every five years. 
 
In your opinion, does this new regulation strengthen auditor 
independence? 
 
6. Kindly add any additional suggestions on detecting financial statement 
fraud and any comments on the topic. 
  
Appendix 3 
Questionnaire Sent to FAR 
 
Auditing Procedures Regarding Financial Statement Fraud 
 
1. Conduct of Audits 
 
From the recent case studies on fraudulent financial statements, some 
companies boosted their revenue by using “one-time actions,” “one-offs,” 
"accounting opportunities" and "accounting tricks" to achieve earnings targets. 
For instance, pulling forward and recognising revenues immediately from 
equipment leases that, under company's historical accounting practices, would 
have been recognised in future years (Xerox). Other case like Lernout & 
Hauspie used “related-party transactions” as the tool for similar revenue 
falsification. 
 
It seems the companies committing accounting fraud often play tricks with 
the concept of “revenue recognition.” What is your opinion of this 
controversy?  
 
2. Auditor Independence/Non-audit services 
 
There have been a number of discussions on independence of auditors. 
Auditing companies often provide non-audit services (consulting) for their 
clients. Following the Xerox case, it was found that “PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
which replaced KPMG as auditor after the accounting problems surfaced, 
charged the company USD 20.4 million in large measure for so-called forensic 
accounting to help identify the alleged fraud, but just half that amount to do the 
most recent audit.”  
 
In our opinion, the auditors cannot be independent if they provide extended 
consulting services to their clients. 
 
 
  
Do you agree with us? How do you think the auditors should avoid such 
conflict of interests? Should auditors be forbidden to do non-audit work? 
 
3. Governance of the Auditing Profession 
 
Who is watching the watchdog (auditors)? In Sweden? In Europe? Do you 
feel that the current governance system of the auditing profession is 
effective, or should changes be made? What changes would you 
recommend? 
 
4. Most of the cases of fraudulent financial statements have been found in 
the United States. Is it possible that this ‘wave’ could also occur in 
Europe? Please explain. Are there any official statistics about the 
fraudulent financial report cases in Sweden so far? 
 
5. Audit Rotation and Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
On July 30, 2002, the president of the USA G. W. Bush signed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. This legislation impacts corporate governance of public companies, 
affecting their officers and directors, their Audit Committees, their 
relationships with their accountants and the audit function itself. The act states 
that the lead audit (or coordinating) partner and the reviewing partner must 
rotate off of the audit every five years. 
 
In your opinion, does this new regulation strengthen auditor 
independence? 
 
6. Kindly add any additional suggestions for detecting financial statement 
fraud and any comments on the topic. 
 
